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MAccountability in Cuba and Puerto Rico
by Anthony P Maingot
n 1991 the Puerto Rican Estado
Libre Asociado will enter its
fourth decade, and the Cuban
revolution will observe its 32nd
anniversary. Historically speak-
ing, both experiments are
young. Yet they both have a
great deal to tell us about crucial
elements of Caribbean and world
politics.
Increasing the political account-
ability of those in power has been
the goal of political movements since
at least the Magna Carta. Whether
the issue is trial by jury, taxation
without representation, regularly
held elections, or universal suffrage,
the movements are facets of the
quest for a responsive elite and a
responsible public. This quest cer-
tainly appears to be at the heart of
the monumental changes taking
place in the USSR and parts of East-
ern Europe, and it underscores the
fact that in the 20th century the
search for accountability transcends
differences in political systems.
What then can Cuba and Puerto
Rico show us about this universal
trend?
Castro's Record
For the past 30 years Fidel Castro's
record on this score has been a mat-
ter of concern. In the early stages of
the revolution "charismatic mobili-
zation" was sociologically under-
standable-no matter what one's
ideological predilections. But the
notion falls short of elucidating
present practices.
During the July trial of General
Arnaldo Ochoa and six other high
officials, Castro minced no words
when he explained that the Leninist
principle of exclusive elite govern-
ance still reigns supreme on the
island. It would be nice, he told the
Consejo de Estado, if the people
agreed with our decisions, but this
was not indispensable: "One cannot
do what public opinion believes or
asks, but what is beneficial for the
nation." If the verdict on Ochoa
were to be decided by a simple pub-
lic opinion poll, Castro concluded,
there would be no need for a Consejo
de Estado.
This Castro, of course, is a differ-
ent Castro from the one who consis-
tently claimed that neither elections
nor plebiscites were needed in Cuba
because the Cuban people exercise
a daily referendum on government
actions. In a country without the
slightest pretense of a free press or
independent interest groups, much
less independent opinion polling,
Castro's assertion of Leninist princi-
ples reflects Cuban reality more
accurately than his previous claims
to an original and sui generis form
of accountability.
Castro's problem is that there no
longer exists much of an audience
for the Leninist formula of govern-
ance. One has the distinct impres-
sion that he is experiencing that
most debilitating of political ail-
ments: isolation. A major cause of
this isolation might well be "cogni-
tive dissonance." Holding on to a
belief system that is sharply at odds
with movements and changes occur-
ring in the real world can bring
about psychologically disturbing
and disorienting effects. When, not
surprisingly, politicians so inclined
are unable to harmonize the world
with their beliefs, the resulting psy-
chological discomfort spurs isolation
from that world-in-change.
The process is all too evident in
contemporary Cuba. It started years
ago when Castro prohibited Cuban
students from studying in several
Eastern European countries. They
were, he said, in danger of being
"corrupted." In 1986 the free agri-
cultural markets were closed
because they were "corrupting" the
peasants. Today he regards peres-
troika and glasnost as little more than
corruptions of socialist practice.
Finally, he accuses the "interna-
tionalist" missions in Angola and
Nicaragua-to say nothing of Pan-
ama-of being riddled with corrup-
tion. The execution of four high
officials, including Ochoa, a "Hero
of the Revolution" no less, and the
virtual gutting of the Ministry of the
Interior, indicate that the anticor-
ruption campaign is part of a dra-
matic shift in political emphasis.
Those who oppose this change
-withdrawal from the corrupting
world currents-appear to be falling
by the wayside. To be sure, Albanian
and North Korean leaders have sur-
vived long-term national hermeticism.
But perhaps a more suitable analogy
to the "reign of virtue" that seems
to be approaching in Cuba, is the
France of Maximilien ("The Incor-
ruptible") Robespierre.
What is the difference between
Castro's recent discourses on Cuba's
lonely stand on principle from
Robespierre's notorious peroration
on "the two opposite genii;' locked
in combat "to determine irretrieva-
bly the destinies of the world"? And
what differences are there with
Robespierre's conclusion that "we
have to strangle the internal as well
as the external enemies of the
republic, or perish with her!"? In a
world in which Hungarian, and pos-
sibly even Soviet, observer status in
the EEC is being discussed, Cuban
puritanical hermeticism has nothing
to contribute to the pan-Caribbean
debate. History has demonstrated all
too often that reigns of virtue end as
reigns of terror.
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Puerto Rico's Choice
In Cuba the revolution continues to
consume its children, and no one
seems to know what the future
holds. In Puerto Rico there is a mas-
sive, multifaceted mobilization
aimed at reaching a definite decision
on the island's status by 1991. In
Cuba, Castro-and only Castro-an-
nounces every July 26 where Cuba
will be heading for at least the next
year. In Puerto Rico the people will
decide the course of the future
through a referendum.
Any choice in Puerto Rico will
involve material and psychological
costs. Two of the choices, improved
commonwealth status and state-
hood, raise the issue of cultural
integration. A third choice, independ-
ence, entails economic costs. In all
cases, moreover, there remains the
issue of reconciling a popular
Puerto Rican choice with an all-
significant act of Congress.
There are those who might be
smitten by the "totalitarian tempta-
tion": "let one charismatic leader
decide." Puerto Ricans, however,
have not chosen this route. They
have made their choice despite con-
siderable disdain from much of the
intellectual world and uncertainty
concerning how the US Congress
will respond to their 1991 decision.
Compared to the shelves of
books on Fidel Castro and his revo-
lution, there are only a few modest
volumes on the father of the Puerto
Rican experiment, Luis Mufioz
Marin. The fascination of academics
and journalists alike with revolution
goes on and on. Yet there is little
international knowledge or under-
standing of a revolution in constitu-
tional doctrine and international
relations that the father of the
Puerto Rican state wrought. His
repeated calls for a "breakthrough
from nationalism:' for "flexibility":'
"adaptability;' "audaciousness;' and
for "the will to experiment, to adapt
and revise" helped prepare the
ground for the peaceful and demo-
cratic decision that Puerto Rico will
make in 1991.
Whether Puerto Ricans vote for
independence, statehood, or an
improved commonwealth status,
they will do so after one of the great
political debates of our century.
Gordon Lewis, certainly no friend of
Mufioz Marin's political formula,
struck a blow for academic and intel-
lectual honesty when he called the
Puerto Rican debate "a magnificent
obsession." But it was more than a
debate on the type of status the
island should have; it was also a
debate on how a people, any people,
can peacefully arrive at a decision as
momentous as what their national
and international regime should be.
Attention to public opinion and
concern over accountability have
been central to Puerto Rican poli-
tics. Plebiscites, political parties
(each promoting a different status),
elections every four years, free and
unencumbered execution of public
opinion polls, and a plethora of
independent interest groups and
news media, all form part of Puerto
Rico's concept of governance. It is
not that Puerto Ricans have
invented much new in terms of dem-
ocratic politics. It is, rather, they
have given new life and meaning to
timeless democratic principles.
Puerto Ricans have reminded
the world that any political system
must fundamentally be an instru-
ment for the securing of a better life
with the greatest freedom for the
greatest number. They have also
reminded us that, since there are
various ways to achieve that goal-
Y
some of them probably not yet even
conceived-it is important to keep
open the avenues of democratic dis-
course. Both principles lead to an
important juridico-political point
much overlooked in the heady post-
colonial days: political independence
is a purposeful creation of positive
law. It is not a natural right but a
remedial right. True, independence
was universally and quite unam-
biguously accepted as the sole rem-
edy to the wrongs of colonialism,
racism, exploitation, and general
oppression. But, logically, if these ills
can be remedied by other political
statuses, the latter clearly have equal
footing as a "right." This is so espe-
cially if they can make a case for
doing a better job of governance.
Thus no particular status enters the
1991 referendum with the aura of
being a natural or inherent right.
Each option will have to convince
the voters-in both Puerto Rico and
the US-of its overall empirical and
emotional merits.
Whether Puerto Rico's 1991 deci-
sion should be held up as the model
of self-determination is not the issue
here: the real issue is what the
Caribbean and the world can learn
from the process that led to 1991.
The days of willy-nilly imitations of a
particular "model":' Puerto Rican or
otherwise, are over.
Puerto Ricans of all political
parties have agreed on the 1991 ref-
erendum. It is a reasonable and
democratic decision that merits our
attention, understanding, and admi-
ration. Unfortunately, since words
and not bullets will decide the out-
come, the world will probably pay lit-
tle attention. Be that as it may, this
indifference will not make the proc-
ess one iota less significant for
those sincerely seeking more
accountability from their leaders. .
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Life (and Death): An Andean Saga
by Mark B. Rosenberg
Afflicted by violence and ableak economy, Perustands as testimony to theperseverance and deprav-ity of humankind in thelast decade of the 20th
century. This dichotomy
was pervasive in the life and death of
Barbara D'Achille, a European refu-
gee who made her home in this
Andean nation of 21 million people
after fleeing the horrors of World
War II.
As a Peruvian resident, D'Achille
became an accomplished environ-
mental and wildlife specialist, using
Peru's print media to establish her
reputation as a professional dedi-
cated to the preservation of the
country's rugged backlands. A regu-
lar contributor to the newspaper
El Comercio, D'Achille became the
nation's ecological conscience and
an indispensable resource on Peru
for the global network of environ-
mental organizations such as the
20th Century Fund and the World
Wildlife Fund.
D'Achille's efforts were remark-
able given Peru's extraordinary
hardships of daily survival. Govern-
ment incompetence, economic
decay, and relentless capital and
human flight are set against the
backdrop of a merciless terrorist
movement, Sendero Luminoso.
Traveling through Huancavelica
on May 31, 1989, D'Achille and her
companions, according to Peruvian
press reports, were intercepted by a
group of Senderistas. The terrorists
released most of her fellow workers,
warning them never to return. But
they did not release D'Achille, order-
ing her to interview them on the
political visions of Sendero. She
refused. They persisted. Her body
was discovered a day later: her skull
crushed by a heavy rock.
In a country accustomed to ter-
rorism, the impact of D'Achille's
murder was profound-perhaps
because she was a European and a
woman, or possibly because of her
commitment to environmentalism,
which even in Peru has growing sup-
port. Some wondered why she was
traveling in an extremely dangerous
district. After all, Sendero had
broadcast its intention to seize con-
trol of Huancavelica by murdering
development workers and officials.
Unfortunately there was little
time to contemplate the larger
meaning of D'Achille's life and
death. On June 3, on a narrow
downtown street choked with Lima's
usual mix of vehicles, tricycle carts,
and people, a street vendor pushed a
dynamite-laden cart under a bus
carrying guards to the presidential
palace. Six died and 19 suffered
serious injuries. The force of the
explosion ripped a six-foot crater in
the road. Shortly after the bombing,
on June 16, a 29-year-old priest was
called out of his religious sanctuary
by passersby who, to the horror of
nearby parishioners, gunned him
down. Less than a week later, the
well-regarded 35-year-old mayor of
another town was shot pointblank in
the back as he carried fresh fruit to
his home for lunch. Sendero took
credit for the murders.
What can Peruvians do to pro-
tect themselves? One US-educated
Peruvian says logic collides with
ethics: the former dictates that ter-
rorists must be physically elimi-
nated. But moral and ethical values
make this response unpalatable. At
any rate, such a policy would proba-
bly be impossible to carry out under
a democratic regime.
Democracy affords the possi-
bility for pluralist dialogue, even
among the most contentious of
forces. But its premises are unity of
purpose among groups and con-
sensus about the rules of the game.
In Peru there is neither unity of pur-
pose nor consensus about the rules
of the game. The administration of
Alan Garcia is in disarray, its policies
having led to the breakdown of the
economy and the dispersion of polit-
ical power. In this setting institu-
tions are giving way to violence in
the conduct of politics. The options
of Peruvians are becoming dis-
tressingly narrow. How can they
tame terrorism without sinking into
Sendero's violent agenda?
Throughout their history Peru-
vians have suffered and inflicted vio-
lence on themselves. Today's
calamities are the newest thread in
this historical and social tapestry.
Although we prefer stories with
happy endings, for Peru no such
ending is in sight. We must celebrate
those whose daily lives become
heroic. D'Achille and other victims
in Peru must be remembered if the
nobility of the human spirit is to sur-
vive-and eventually triumph. *
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Latin American and Caribbean Center
Florida International University
University Park
Miami, FL 33199
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R E P
Crisis and Carnival: Rio de Janeiro
by Elizabeth Station
any Borazilans woula
argue that Rio de
Janeiro has been slid-
ing into financial,
administrative, and
moral decadence ever
since Juscelino
Kubitschek moved the national capi-
tal from Rio to Brasilia in 1960.
Events in 1988-89 seem to have
pushed the Cidade Maravilhosa even
further towards the abyss. In Sep-
tember 1988, with Mayor Saturnino
Braga struggling under a 60-billion
cruzado deficit and a 142-billion
cruzado debt, Rio was declared
bankrupt. In the following weeks,
municipal health and education
workers protested shrinking salaries
and 30% monthly inflation with a
strike that paralyzed public schools
and hospitals for 162 days.
Empty city coffers and a lack of
new investment have hastened the
process of physical deterioration.
Local residents are growing so used
to the city's estimated 20,000 pot-
holes that they baptize them with
colorful names and signposts. The
feeling of malaise seemed most
apparent just before last November's
municipal elections. Disillusionment
with corruption and old-style politi-
cians led many Cariocas to indicate
"Macaco Tiao" a belligerent chim-
panzee from the Rio zoo, as their
preferred candidate for mayor.
The people of Rio de Janeiro tra-
ditionally make a heroic effort to
abandon their troubles during the
holidays, but this year forgetfulness
was harder to come by than usual.
Just days before Christmas, the bru-
tal assassination of rubber tapper
Elizabeth Station is a free-lance
journalist in Rio de Janeiro.
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Chico Mendes in faraway Acre sent
shock waves through the local ecol-
ogy movement. Next, on New Year's
Eve, 55 tourists drowned when an
overloaded and unseaworthy plea-
sure boat, the Bateau Mouche IV,
sank at the entrance to Guanabara
Bay. Closer to the shore, the legen-
dary girl from Ipanema had to think
twice before taking a dip at the
beach of the same name. According
to the weekly magazine Veja, 460
tons of untreated sewage and hun-
dreds more of toxic industrial
wastes are dumped into Rio oceans
daily, rendering both the sand and
the sea unsafe.
Carnival Endures
Reeling from the punches, Rio de
Janeiro raised its head in February
to face the last Carnival celebration
of the decade. "Carnival is the only
serious thing left in Brazil," a hard-
core reveler told TV Globo on the
eve of the four days of festivities,
and so it would seem. The top escolas
de samba, or neighborhood samba
clubs, begin training for the pre-
Lenten event as early as August.
Handsomely paid and highly profes-
sional carnavalescos design elaborate
costumes, sumptuous floats, and
catchy choreography to illustrate
the club's theme song (samba de
enredo) for the annual parade.
Neighborhood entrepreneurs, poli-
ticians, and bicheiros (who run the
numbers racket) put up the capital
to underwrite each club's entry in
the pageant. Meanwhile, two or
three thousand club members
scrape together the money for their
costumes, called fantasias, and steel
themselves for endless rehearsals.
The spectacular two-day parade
by the 18 biggest and wealthiest
samba clubs helps Rio, despite its
difficulties, to remain the tourist
and media mecca of Brazil. In 1988
Carnival was marred by heavy rains
and landslides that left nearly 300
dead around the state. This year the
dearth of funds for public-works
projects meant that shoring up the
city against a similar disaster would
be impossible. The fear the rain
might return, coupled with the real-
ization the public hospital shutdown
would deny emergency services to
any accident victims, added to the
verge-of-apocalypse feeling among
already melodramatic Cariocas.
The opening minutes of this
year's parade provided television
viewers all over Brazil with high
drama. Spectators gasped when in
the opening minutes of the specta-
cle, a faultily-constructed float car-
rying 52-year-old beautician Neusa
Monteiro collapsed and she plum-
meted headfirst onto the pavement.
In a typical show of Carioca excess,
Monteiro had planned to parade in
full regalia with 15 different samba
clubs. She had rented a special bus
to tote her costumes to the sam-
b6dromo and a motorcycle to ferry
her between points of the parade.
After Monteiro was rushed to one of
the city's few functioning hospitals,
traumatized TV announcers pro-
vided up-to-the-minute reports on
her condition. (When she died of her
injuries two weeks later, her daugh-
ters promised not to sue the
builders of the float.)
The rest of the marathon contin-
ued without further incident and,
arguably, without a great deal of
emogao, or biting political commen-
tary. One club, Unidos da Ponte, per-
functorily performed an
environmental samba that lamented
urban air pollution, the burning of
the Amazonian forests, vanishing
wildlife, and destruction-for-profit.
S
The Acadimicos do Salgueiro, a club
that traditionally treats racial
themes, delivered a not-too-angry
assessment of black Brazil 100 years
after abolition ("My samba takes away
pain and brings joy/Yes, I'm black/
liberty and poetry"). Sao Clemente, one
of the only samba schools of the
white, middle-class Zona Sul,
paraded to protest Brazil's obedient
payment of its foreign debt. Club
members dressed as coffee beans,
bananas, and petroleum-all
national exports-intoned a bois-
terous samba that decried the
declining terms of trade for Bra-
zilian products on the world market.
"I cry, I shout, and I speak because I
love my country," bumped and wig-
gled Sao Clemente. "The only thing
they can't export is the people's hope to be
happy."
Just before eight in the morning
on Fat Tuesday, when all but two of
the escolas de samba had sung and
danced their way to the end of the
runway, a weary crowd blinked and
stretched and waited for Beija-Flor
of Nil6polis to appear. An expectant
air hung over the concrete bleachers
of the samb6dromo. For two nights
fans had witnessed a lavish display
of glittery, ostentatious costumes
and towering, Disneyesque floats.
Yet Beija-Flor the club that had
sparked controversy when it in-
troduced such luxury into the
spectacle over a decade before, had
announced a puzzling title for its
1989 theme. In "Rats and Vultures,
Let Go of My Costume," carnavalesco
Joaozinho Trinta promised to
"let the grande confusao between
luxury and poverty shine." Months
before he had announced plans to
unleash the"common people of the
street today-beggars, alcoholics,
street kids, lunatics, and the un-
employed," as the protagonists of
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Beija-Flor's entry in the parade.
The result was a cleverly calcu-
lated blend of popular art, excellent
music, and stinging social criticism.
Hundreds of convincingly shabby
sambistas, dressed in tatters and gar-
bage, opened the parade singing
"In life I'm a beggar/But I'm king of
carnival." A mob of toothless bag
ladies gleefully danced around a
float crowned by a gigantic Christ
figure swabbed in black plastic. Evok-
ing the famous Corcovado statue
that symbolizes Rio de Janeiro, the
monument's outstretched arms
protected a horde of ragged street
boys and afavela school. Next came
deranged, Dickensian madmen,
followed by fat, decadent popes
and bishops and politicians on
the take.
Further along, atop a float
depicting a "beggar's banquet," the
rich savored tempting delicacies
while the poor pulled decomposing
scraps of food out of trash cans at
the bottom. Later, a scantily-clad
mulata gyrated on the highest tier of
a towering fountain, while barefoot
street urchins romped in the spray
of water below. An enormous, tat-
tered banner invited the crowd to
join the march of the disenfran-
chised: "People of the street: Pull
the remains of luxury from the gar-
bage of this immense country....
Make your costumes and come
along to the grand masked ball." The
spectacle was moved along by a
throng of men and women wearing
the orange cotton smocks of Rio
garis, or garbage collectors and
street sweepers.
Joaozinho Trinta, the cherubic,
grey-haired genius responsible for it
all, triumphantly brought up the
rear. Celebrating his own humble
origins as a northeastern migrant
and shop clerk as much as the every-
day heroism of the underpaid public
servant, Trinta wore a gari smock as
he sprayed the bleachers with water
from a street sweeper's hose. He
later explained that the hose sym-
bolized the need to wash away decay
and corruption in Brazil. "I made an
invitation for this country to
change;' said Trinta. "The huge
opening parade of the miserable
showed the country as it is. Then
came opulence, which demonstrates
the reason for the misery."
Such comments linking luxo
(luxury) and lixo (garbage) have
won Trinta notoriety. In 1976, angrily
defending Beija-Flor's unprece-
dented use of expensive, flashy cos-
tumes and floats in that year's
Carnival parade, Trinta snapped
"the people like luxury; misery
is for intellectuals." The statement
helped earn him the enmity of the
Brazilian left, who accused Trinta of
designing sambas that exalted the
dictatorship. Trinta refused to keep
his controversial opinions to him-
self. "Those who know the samba
clubs also know, for example, how
hard it is to get a black man to dress
up like a slave," he remarked.
"That's what he is all year long, of
course. For Carnival he wants to
come out as Louis XV, a Dutchman,
a king."
This year's performance forced
the intellectuals to forget their feud
with Trinta, and left and right began
to heap superlatives upon him
before the last sambista stepped off
the stadium floor. "Beija-Flor com-
pletely changed the aesthetic of
Carnival," glowed the conservative
O Globo. Fernando Gabeira, a 1970s
guerrilla who now leads the Bra-
zilian Green Party, praised Trinta
for possessing "a more practical,
personal sense of justice than the
Socialists ... and a broader ecologi-
cal intuition than many ecologists."
Others claimed the history of Carni-
val would be divided, henceforth,
into two periods-before and after
Beija-Flo.
Two days later the revelation that
Beija-Flor had not won the samba
club contest came as a great shock.
First-place honors went to Imperatriz
Leopoldinense, a three-time cham-
pion who had performed an elegant,
noncontroversial samba depicting
the history of Brazil from independ-
ence to the declaration of the repub-
lic. Imperatriz edged out Beija-Flor
by a single point, allegedly because
one of the judges felt Beija-Flor's use
of an African dialect in its samba de
enredo made the song inaccessible to
the audience. Skeptics remarked
that the club's second-place finish
was no coincidence. Uninvited,
Trinta had brought a giant mirror
to the samb6dromo, inspiring the
magazine Isto E Senhor to declare
"Brazil is afraid of its own reflection."
Instead of embracing Carnival as a
time to forget, Trinta used the festi-
val to put poverty, corruption,
opportunism, and waste on center
stage.
Now What?
When the party was over, Brazil
woke up to a reality both better and
worse than the one Trinta had
painted. Rio had not flooded or
fallen into the sea, the ailing hospi-
tals had functioned well enough to
meet demand, and, despite the city's
international reputation for vio-
lence, crime was down 20% from the
previous Carnival. Yet during the
four days of revelry, Brazil offered
exile to Paraguayan dictator Alfredo
Stroessner and 18 inmates died
when a sadistic Sao Paulo prison
warden stuffed 50 men into a tiny
cell meant for one. Inflation crept
upward despite a government freeze
on prices and wages, and Brazil
adopted its third currency revision
in three years.
Politically some bright spots
dotted the horizon. A pugnacious
former housewife named Regina
Gordilho led an anticorruption
crusade in the Rio de Janeiro city
council. Just after Carnival, Coun-
cilwoman Gordilho found and fired
388 "ghost employees," beneficiaries
of old-time patronage practices that
enabled them to collect city pay-
checks without working a single day
in the chambers. Organized labor in
Rio showed new combativeness dur-
ing a two-day, nationwide general
strike to negotiate salary hikes in
March. Brazilians will directly elect
a president in November for the first
time in nearly 30 years. The favorite
candidate among Cariocas is veteran
populist and former governor
Leonel Brizola. His claim to fame in
Rio de Janeiro? He built the
samb6dromo. *
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War, Peace, and Music: The Guianas
by Kenneth Bilby
usic must change life
in a big way:' says
Django. "I'm learn-
ing music to call
attention to our
grievances by singing
about them. Then
others will realize what's really
happening."
Django is a young Ndjuka
Maroon, a member of one of the six
Guianese tribes descended from
African slaves who escaped from
Surinamese plantations during the
17th and 18th centuries. Now in his
early twenties, he has lived in the
coastal French Guianese border
town of Saint-Laurent-du-Maroni
since the age of two. Django is one
of several hundred Maroons inhab-
iting the shantytowns scattered
across the outskirts of this overseas
French municipality with a popula-
tion of roughly 9,000. In late 1986 he
watched from across the river as the
Surinamese town of Albina was
reduced to cinders, another casualty
in the bitter struggle pitting the
Maroon guerrillas led by Ronnie
Brunswijk against the military gov-
ernment headed by Lieutenant
Colonel Desi Bouterse. Since then
Django has been paying close atten-
tion to the plight of the more than
10,000 Maroon refugees who fled
their homes in Suriname after gov-
ernment forces began their massa-
cres of Maroon civilians. Many of
these refugees, including some of
Django's own relatives, are still liv-
ing in temporary camps in French
Guiana.
Kenneth Bilby, an anthropologist
at The Johns Hopkins University,
worked with Maroons in French
Guiana between 1983 and 1987,
and during 1987 played keyboards
with Local Song.
Like many young Maroons in
Saint-Laurent, Django grew up
alongside Alukus, Paramakas, and
Saramakas, as well as his own
Ndjuka people. He belongs to the
first generation of town dwellers,
whose parents migrated from the
Maroon villages that line the inte-
rior rivers of Suriname and French
Guiana. These urban and semi-
urban Maroons have been busy
evolving a musical subculture much
like those that thrive in many parts
of contemporary urban Africa.
Starting in the 1970s the young
Maroons of Saint-Laurent adopted a
new drumming style called Aleke and
began to form volunteer associa-
tions. These drumming groups
could almost have been lifted from
the pages of an anthropological
monograph on life in a modern West
African city. Sporting imaginative
names and hierarchies of officers,
the Aleke bands of Saint-Laurent
were at first composed of young
Maroons from the same tribe, and
often the same clan. More recently
bands with an interethnic member-
ship have emerged, as young
Ndjukas, Paramakas, and Alukus
come together to make music
expressing the experiences they
share.
Political Rhythms
Maroons have always used song as a
vehicle for social commentary and
criticism. When the civil war in
Suriname broke out in 1986, and
thousands of refugees came stream-
ing into Saint-Laurent, the Aleke
bands were quick to set the traumatic
events to music. One popular song,
delivered by a leader and chorus in
the Ndjuka language and usually
interspersed with biting improvisa-
tions, went as follows: "Our Suriname
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must have freedom/peace/Bouterse has
ruined Suriname."
By early 1987 the refugees them-
selves-who were now swelling the
Maroon population of Saint-
Laurent and bringing with them
tales of atrocities committed against
family and friends-were forming
their own Aleke bands. The names of
these bands made powerful state-
ments of protest: A Gi Tjali (It
Grieves Us), Mi No Be Wani (I Didn't
Want This), and Fii Lon (Flight to
Freedom). As the carnage across the
river continued, the Maroon
enclaves of Saint-Laurent vibrated
with the defiant performances of
these bands. The targeting of
Maroon civilians by Surinamese
army patrols was provoking an
upsurge in ethnic consciousness.
Young Aleke performers came
together in a ritualistic dance, don-
ning the abandoned loincloths and
wraparound skirts of their parents
as symbols of resistance.
The Aleke phenomenon is one
facet of a buzzing Maroon musical
subculture in Saint-Laurent. The
age-old rhythms of traditional
funeral ceremonies and African-
based religious cults coexist with the
new sounds of dance bands using
amplifiers, imported electric gui-
tars, keyboards, and drum kits.
Young Ndjuka, Aluku, Paramaka,
and Saramaka musicians are trying
their hands at everything from
kaseko, the contemporary dance
music of Paramaribo, to reggae,
French Antillean zouk, African
soukous, and various combinations
0
of these sounds. On weekends the
nightspots frequented by
Maroons-makeshift nightclubs,
rented dance halls, and spruced-up
yards-throb with life. The crowds
are large and almost exclusively
Maroon. Not surprisingly most of
the French civil servants and the
Creole majority in Saint-Laurent
remain oblivious to the robust sub-
terranean culture that lives and
breathes in their back yards. The
two worlds, one dominant and the
other powerless, seldom come into
meaningful contact.
It was not long before the electric
dance bands added their voices to
the protests of the Aleke singers.
Django, a veteran of several Aleke
groups, helped to form a mixed
Ndjuku/Aluku dance band called
Local Song in 1986. The band's
name expresses its members' desire
to counter the tendency in French
Guiana to glorify anything that
comes from afar, especially from
France, while devaluing everything
local. Although there are several
popular Maroon dance bands in
Saint-Laurent, with engaging names
such as Switi Skin, Ennymo Stars,
Lifemo Stars, and Music Explosion,
Local Song seems to be the most
vociferous about the war next door.
Among their songs are "Feti Taanga"
("Struggle Hard") and ' ungle Com-
mando"' a blistering militant-style
reggae recounting the attempts of
Brunswijk's guerrillas to defend
Maroon civilians from persecution
by Bouterse's troops. Both songs are
in the Ndjuka language, which itself
is an act of cultural resistance. But it
was "Revolution ina Saanan," also
sung in Ndjuka, that became a local
protest anthem for Maroons suf-
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fering the effects of war in 1987 (see
box, p. 10).
Although Local Song has never
been inside a recording studio, cas-
settes of live performances have
been informally copied and circu-
lated within the Maroon community.
By late 1987 even Ndjuka and Aluku
children could be heard singing
"Revolution ina Saanan" as they
played in shantytown alleyways.
Django, it seems, was succeeding in
his goal: his musical message was
getting across.
Bouterse and the Maroons
The music of Django and others like
him gives voice to the indignation
and frustration of a victimized and
disenfranchised people. Those in
power have yet to persuade most
Maroons that the long history of dis-
crimination against them is ending.
The vast majority of Surinamese
Maroons were not represented in
the November 1987 elections that
took place in their country, since
they were either cut off from the
coastal region or stranded in refu-
gee camps in French Guiana. Judg-
ing from the sentiments expressed
by the Aleke singers and Maroon
dance bands of Saint-Laurent, the
political coalition that won could
not have counted on much support
from these people had they been
able to vote.
Although Bouterse's own party,
the Nationale Democratische Partij,
was soundly defeated in the elec-
tions, many, if not most, Maroons
suspect the new government still
takes orders from the military. Their
suspicions are supported by allega-
tions, widely reported in Dutch
newspapers such as De Volkskrant
and Het Parool, that the civilian
authorities have been unable to act
against the wishes of Bouterse.
Brunswijk, the rebel leader, has
made repeated overtures to the
new government, but until recently
Bouterse has vetoed all attempts to
begin serious negotiations. It has
been alleged that the civilian govern-
ment is "powerless to defy Bouterse"
(The Washington Post, January 4, 1989).
Little wonder then the Bouterse
government has failed to make
amends for the slaughtering of
Maroon civilians and the massive
destruction of property that have
taken place since 1986. There are
indications, however, that this situa-
tion may be changing, as the desire
for a nonmilitary solution continues
to grow in Paramaribo (The Miami
Herald, July 23, 1989).
Django and his companions be-
long to a great Afro-American tradi-
tion of musical protest. They and
thousands like them in other parts of
this hemisphere are the anonymous
counterparts of famous social critics
such as Bob Marley, The Mighty
Sparrow, and Stevie Wonder. They
share with these artists a common
creative urge, a cultural penchant
that runs as deep as the long drums
of Aleke. Their political critique is
driven by a musical impulse that has
time and again proven its remark-
able capacity to endure. As long as
Django and the Maroon people he
represents have legitimate griev-
ances, their anger will not be
silenced. Any government in Suri-
name interested in restoring har-
mony would be well advised to lend
them an ear. a
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Two Plans, No Solution
by Edgar Ortiz
treasury secretary Nicholas
Brady is a palliative to two
kinds of Latin American
threats: widespread debt
repudiation and political
instability. Mass uprisings
and the electoral victories of popu-
lists Carlos Andres Perez in Ven-
ezuela and Carlos Menem in
Argentina underscore such threats.
The specter of such challenges in
neighboring Mexico is particularly
troubling to US policymakers.
In many ways the Brady proposal
breaks new ground. First, it urges
private banks to reduce their debt
portfolios, ease the interest burden
of debtor countries, and absorb
much of the cost of both. Second, it
calls for active efforts by the World
Bank and the International Mone-
tary Fund (IMF) to promote debt
relief. Third, it recognizes the debt
crisis as a political issue by linking
US national security to sociopolitical
conditions in the debtor countries.
This recognition potentially opens
the way to negotiations between
lender banks and debtor countries
that integrate criteria of economic
growth and social welfare.
Yet the Brady proposal-even as
modified by the July accord between
Mexico and its foreign creditors-is
fundamentally flawed. As its Mexi-
can critics point out, no such plan
can be successful unless it focuses
on the structural causes of the hemi-
sphere's debt crisis.
Edgar Ortiz is professor of finance
and economics at the Universidad
Nacional Aut6noma de Mexico and
the Centro de Investigaci6n y
Docencia Econ6mica.
Mexican Reactions
Mexico is one of several debtor
countries that have proposed simi-
lar measures in recent years. Since
1985, when the price of oil plum-
meted, Mexican officials have main-
tained that lenders should share
with borrowers the responsibility for
the debt crisis. President Carlos
Salinas de Gortari stresses that eco-
nomic recovery should be based on
domestic savings, but that without a
substantially reduced debt load, his
programs of economic readjustment
cannot succeed. These two supposi-
tions underlie not only his team's
international debt policy but its
domestic "Economic Growth and
Stability Pact":' which Mexican busi-
ness, labor, and peasant representa-
tives have pledged to support.
Hence the lenders should ease debt
payments as a catalyst to Mexican,
and by extension Latin American,
economic recovery.
Mexican officials and leaders of
the private sector thus look kindly
on the fundamentals of the Brady
plan. Their responses to its specific
measures, however, have ranged
from cautious optimism to hostile
criticism. On the optimistic side are
the Treasury Ministry, the National
Association of Manufacturers, and
the Coordinating Council of Entre-
preneurs. The unknown ingredient,
they maintain, is whether private
lenders and multilateral institutions
will support the plan. The July "new
plan" only marginally addresses this
doubt, as the extent and form of
support by private banks is unclear.
Expressing criticism are ele-
ments of the public sector, labor
groups such as the National Federa-
tion of Labor Syndicates, the Car-
denista wing of the Institutional
Revolutionary Party, and opposition
parties like the Popular Socialist
Party and the Mexican Socialist
Party. They object to the Brady
plan's emphasis on loan condi-
tionality, debt payment, and debt
swaps. They also object to its vague
handling of debt-market exchange
and, even as modified by the July
accord, its inadequate debt reduc-
tions and incentives to private
lenders.
On the subject of conditionality,
critics observe the Brady plan
diverges almost imperceptibly from
previous US policy. It requires
debtor countries, under close super-
vision by the World Bank and the
IMF, to continue opening their bor-
ders to free trade and foreign invest-
ment, while imposing wage and
salary discipline and trimming their
public sectors. Detractors of the
Brady plan point out that these
requirements, along with the
emphasis on debt payments, com-
promise the sovereignty of Mexico
and other Latin American nations
and divert both financial and
human resources from the task of
national development.
Perhaps more widely opposed
by Mexicans is the Brady plan's
emphasis on debt swaps. Their
opposition revolves around several
factors: the negative impact of debt
swaps on foreign reserves and infla-
tion (based on the conversion of
dollars to pesos); the relative success
of the government's heterodox
adjustment program that (partly
because of the large accumulation
of foreign reserves) has lowered
Mexico's rate of inflation; and the
fact that since 1986 debt swaps in
Mexico have amounted to $6.9
billion, or about 56% of total for-
eign investment.
The high volume of debt swaps
has contributed to the decline of
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Mexico's foreign reserves from $15
billion in 1988 to, according to some
estimates, as low as $3.5 billion in
1989. This volume indicates, more-
over, that the debt-swap alternative
in Mexico is nearing exhaustion. In
any case recent experience suggests
that Mexico's stabilization plans
should aim for high volumes of for-
eign reserves and limited debt
swaps.
The question of market
exchange is also crucial, since
debtor nations seek to exchange
their debt at current market prices.
This would lead to a major debt
reduction of 67% for Mexico. As for
Brazil and Argentina, the two other
mammoths of Latin American debt,
it would mean a reduction of 73%
and 82%, respectively.
Mexico's program of economic
readjustment requires that its yearly
debt outlays be slashed by at least
50%. This reduction, however,
would not guarantee economic
recovery in Mexico or elsewhere
without complementary renegotia-
tions of the terms of international
trade and technology transfer. The
Brady plan's original goal of 20%
debt reductions, and even the new
plan's goal of a 35% reduction in
principle on Mexico's privately held
foreign debt, would bring little ben-
efit to Mexico or any other debtor
nation.
Although the new plan proposes
the lowering of interest rates, doing
so is at the option of the banks, and
eventual rises in interest rates would
erase the gains of debt reduction.
Further, Mexico and other debtors
would need financial resources
beyond those resulting from debt
reductions. Yet the Brady initiative
does not mention specific tax incen-
tives or regulatory changes that
would lead private banks to make
available such resources. The July
accord, insofar as it provides for
new loans at lower interest rates,
essentially piles new loans on top
of old ones.
Will Things Get Better or Worse?
Although leading business sectors
and high government officials in
Mexico consider the Brady plan a
fair, if vague, proposal for debt
relief, the critics must be taken seri-
ously. At best the plan's initial and
revised versions would ease Mexico's
debt burden, and probably that of
other Latin American countries, for
just a few years. As such they can do
little more than recent bailout pro-
grams, which have simply added
more wood to the fire.
As things stand, we can expect
either debt repudiation in the short
run or a more profound debt crisis
in the long run. Future generations
will pay for the mistakes of today,
such as substituting runaway bor-
rowing for sound taxation in Latin
America and postponing reductions
in US domestic and foreign deficits.
There are alternatives, however.
The Brady plan could play a signifi-
cant role if it were revised to call for
greater reductions in the debt bur-
den of Mexico and Latin America.
Yet even the increased reduction
proposed in the new plan is not
enough, especially because of the
weak incentives for banks to support
the reduction. North Atlantic politi-
cal leaders and bankers must recog-
nize the need for structural reforms.
What we need is a comprehensive
approach to the debt crisis, which
stresses equitable terms of interna-
tional trade and technology transfer.
Such an approach could serve as
the basis for establishing broader
accords for international develop-
ment and social welfare. From the
standpoint of Mexico and Latin
America, anything less is doomed
to fail. .
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Argentine Prospects
by Enrique Loncan
Since 1979 annual growth in
Argentina's GDP has plum-
meted from 6.7% to 0.4%,
and its rate of poverty has
leaped from 76% to an esti-
mated 30% of the nation's
population. Can Carlos
Menem's administration reverse the
economy's decline and forestall mass
unrest and political instability?
In asserting his leadership
Menem named to his cabinet a com-
bination of moderates from within
and outside the Peronist ranks. One
of Menem's shrewdest moves was
to appoint as minister of economy
Miguel Roig, former vice president
of Bunge y Born, an Argentine mul-
tinational that is traditionally a
scapegoat for Peronist resentment.
Following Roig's death on July 14,
Menem appointed in his place Nes-
tor Rapanelli, a former chief execu-
tive of Bunge y Born. These two
appointments allayed the wide-
spread fears within the business sec-
tor of a resurgence of traditional
Peronism. So did the appointment
of Domingo Cavallo, an economist
inclined to the promotion of export
trade and improved relations with
the US, as minister of foreign
affairs. Still another key appoint-
ment was that of Italo Luder, a
Peronist, as minister of defense. As
interim president in 1975, Luder
played a key role in mobilizing the
armed forces against domestic sub-
versive activity. His credibility with
the armed forces promises to ease
tensions between the government's
civilian and military wings.
Not to be overlooked is that
Menem's overtures to business and
the military have taken place in a
context of political splintering
within the opposition Radical Party.
The electoral loss by the Radical
Party and the divergent views
between ex-president Alfonsin and
defeated presidential candidate
Eduardo Angeloz have resulted in
intraparty divisions, which widen
Menem's margin for political
initiative.
The Economy: Is There Hope?
After selecting the non-Peronist,
orthodox Roig as economic minister,
Menem declared that Roig's pro-
gram would be based on a neo-
Keynesian econometric model devel-
oped by American Nobel laureate
Lawrence Klein. This and other
points of inconsistency raise funda-
mental questions. Will the Menem
administration pursue an economic
policy of traditional Peronism? Or
will it pursue a modified policy, at
least during the current economic
emergency? Can either approach
gain the confidence of investors and
reactivate the economy?
Menem has surprised doubters
and supporters alike by embarking
on a disciplined course of austerity.
Among the likely economic policies
are these:
* Foreign investment will be favored,
particularly in the export sectors.
* Existing industries will receive sub-
stantial protection.
* The public sector will be reduced
only marginally, and limited priva-
tization of public enterprises will
take place.
* Fiscal reform will be introduced.
* The foreign debt will be a source
of friction, but not rupture, in
international relations.
* Interest rates will remain high, but
flexible, subsidized credit lines will
be created to support small and
medium enterprises.
* Wage measures will be restrictive,
and union demands will be
addressed through concessions in
social services.
* Financial pressure on agriculture
will be eased, yet the sector will
continue to subsidize the rest of
the economy.
A Call for Realism
This scenario does not promise
quick recovery, though the initial
signs give reason for qualified opti-
mism. Menem's most urgent chal-
lenge is to implement the unpopular
measures that, while necessary to
stop Argentina's hyperinflation,
could quickly erode his political cap-
ital. Menem's early policies indicate
he is prepared to take the political
risk.
On the political side, then, the
following policies can be anticipated:
* Assertion of presidential authority
over union bosses and the leader-
ship of the Justicialista Party.
* Improvement of Menem's relations
with the military as a safeguard
against the possible resurgence of
subversive activity.
* Promotion of a constitutional
amendment to reduce the presi-
dential term of office from six to
four years, but allowing reelection
and incorporating Peronist social
rights.
* A foreign policy that seeks
improved dialogue with the US.
In the midst of crisis Argentina's
electorate found in Menem an alter-
native to its feelings of frustration
and resignation. The new govern-
ment took office with a vote of con-
fidence as large as the hopes of the
populace. The greatest risk is not
failure, but that achievements will be
measured with a yardstick of unre-
alistic expectations. .
(Translated by Hemisphere stafJ)
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Stories of Foreign Language
by John V Lombardi
n the beginning there was for-
eign language and culture.
"Foreign language and cul-
ture," we educators said, "will
save the US. They will bring the
US to the world and maintain
the American dream."
Our patrons looked upon our
words and found them persuasive.
Ford Foundation largess rained
down on a favored cohort of US uni-
versities and developed expertise in
international studies. Funding
through the National Defense Edu-
cation Act Title VI built programs in
the less commonly taught languages.
The international education constit-
uency thrived from the late 1950s
through the glorious 1960s, and on
into a less bountiful 1970s. By the
1980s, however, the constituency
had fallen on hard times.
What happened to our dreams?
Did we teach badly? Did we fail to
produce expertise? Or did we just
fail?
A Two-Story Perspective
It is not obvious, at first glance, that
there are problems in the teaching
of foreign languages. Enrollment is
up, classes are full, requirements are
tougher, and everybody is talking
about foreign languages. Why then
are we worried? The answer is easy.
Let's first look at the story we used
to tell, one that worked. That story
went like this: foreign language lets
US citizens understand other
people-what they are talking
about, what they are doing, and why
they are doing it. Knowledge of for-
eign languages is a utilitarian tool.
John V Lombardi is provost and
vice president of Academic Affairs
at The Johns Hopkins University.
In a dangerous world, it is a defense.
It permits us to understand our
friends and our enemies. It is there-
fore vital to national defense. Based
on this essentially correct set of pos-
tulates, we proposed the US govern-
ment create a program to bolster
the nation's language capabilities.
We watched as our elected officials
lined up to salute the flag and sup-
port the program, appropriately
called the National Defense Foreign
Language Act.
The program was a winner. So
what happened? We learned that
some officials had used programs
for unsavory purposes and that our
colleagues overseas looked askance
at our close connection to the
defense establishment. No longer
could we tolerate the association of
language and defense.
Thus we shifted the rationale for
teaching foreign languages from
defense to education. There was
nothing inherently wrong in doing
so. Nevertheless, language programs
began competing for funds with
other worthy priorities, such as stu-
dent loans and science education. In
addition we lost the crisp precision
of our original story. The new, less
convincing story goes something like
this: study foreign language to learn
about the world, to become disci-
plined, and to reassert US compet-
itiveness in the world market.
With rare exceptions, however,
studying foreign language as we do
in US universities teaches less about
the world than a one-semester
course on Latin America. Likewise it
requires a minimum of two to four
years of study before our students
achieve the requisite facility to
appreciate foreign literature. A
decent course on great works in
translation would do a better job of
educating our students. As for
teaching discipline, a semester of
ROTC would do it much more
quickly and effectively.
Perhaps the greatest fraud of all
is the notion that learning foreign
languages can make the US more
competitive. True, we would
improve our access to the Japanese
market if we learned more about the
Japanese and employed some people
in our firms who spoke passable
Japanese. So why were we so compet-
itive in the fifties and sixties? Why
did US cars, radios, electronics, and
heavy equipment set the interna-
tional standard? Did more people at
General Motors speak Spanish? Did
IBM officials discuss the virtues of
their technology in fluent Japanese?
Of course not. Competitiveness is a
function of quality and price. Lan-
guage allows us to talk about com-
petitive products, but it does not
make the products more
competitive.
All of this would be more toler-
able if we actually taught students
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who are not language majors to
speak another language. The truth is
we rarely do so. We give our stu-
dents a little grammar, a little vocab-
ulary, and some inadequate training
in the language laboratory. We then
send the fortunate few to a good
program abroad. If they work hard
and avoid other Americans, they
return speaking passable German,
French, Spanish, or whatever as a
result of their immersion in the cul-
ture, not as a result of our university
curriculum.
We the educators are to blame.
We know how to teach foreign lan-
guage, but we refuse to do it right.
Why not? Because doing so would
ate an autonomous department of
language instruction brings down
the combined wrath of literary aca-
demia. The response often takes the
form of a collaborative attack by the
chairs of Spanish, Portuguese,
French, Italian, and German depart-
ments-characters whose previous
relations resembled those of Arab
and Israeli leaders.
Writing a New Story
Why don't we put the graduates of
our language classes through a com-
petency test to discover whether
they speak the language or not?
Because competency testing throws
a scare into most literature estab-
lishments. After all, it is based on
the academically unpopular notion
that language is a relatively straight-
forward skill. The results of such a
test might lead us to reallocate
money away from the four-
hundredth rectification of the
meaning of the "Quijotesque" in
Cervantes's minor novellas.
Deans and other sensitive
administrators have not given up,
however. They have called for the
use of competency testing and the
creation of think tanks for the devel-
opment of language instruction.
One such think tank operates at The
Johns Hopkins School for Advanced
International Studies. Its dedicated
instructors of language are busy
with subversive investigations of new
teaching methods. Complemented
by demonstration projects at partici-
pating universities, this approach
offers a test environment that may
show us the way to improved lan-
guage teaching.
VOICES
FROM
LATIN
AMERICA
ORBIS BOOKS
What should educators do? We
can begin by recognizing that lan-
guage requirements mean nothing
without exit-proficiency require-
ments. We must also recognize that
proficiency requirements cannot be
fulfilled without budgets and with-
out rewards-pay, promotion, and
prestige-commensurate with the
task. Neither the federal government
nor private foundations should give
a dime to any international program
that lacks serious commitment to
language teaching and competency
testing. A benchmark of such com-
mitment, and thus a high priority
for funding, are yearlong programs
of overseas study that incorporate
before-and-after testing.
Educators must listen to the
public. When people do not buy
goods there is usually a reason: the
product is too expensive, it does not
work, or both. The public does not
buy our foreign-language story
because it's too expensive, it does
not teach people how to speak the
language, and it wastes their time. m
H. McKennie Goodpasture
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Reports: Education
Stories of Foreign Language
by John V. Lombardi
n the beginning there was for-
eign language and culture.
"Foreign language and cul-
ture," we educators said, "will
save the US. They will bring the
US to the world and maintain
the American dream."
Our patrons looked upon our
words and found them persuasive.
Ford Foundation largess rained
down on a favored cohort of US uni-
versities and developed expertise in
international studies. Funding
through the National Defense Edu-
cation Act Title VI built programs in
the less commonly taught languages.
The international education constit-
uency thrived from the late 1950s
through the glorious 1960s, and on
into a less bountiful 1970s. By the
1980s, however, the constituency
had fallen on hard times.
What happened to our dreams?
Did we teach badly? Did we fail to
produce expertise? Or did we just
fail?
A Two-Story Perspective
It is not obvious, at first glance, that
there are problems in the teaching
of foreign languages. Enrollment is
up, classes are full, requirements are
tougher, and everybody is talking
about foreign languages. Why then
are we worried? The answer is easy.
Let's first look at the story we used
to tell, one that worked. That story
went like this: foreign language lets
US citizens understand other
people-what they are talking
about, what they are doing, and why
they are doing it. Knowledge of for-
eign languages is a utilitarian tool.
John V Lombardi is provost and
vice president of Academic Affairs
at The Johns Hopkins University.
In a dangerous world, it is a defense.
It permits us to understand our
friends and our enemies. It is there-
fore vital to national defense. Based
on this essentially correct set of pos-
tulates, we proposed the US govern-
ment create a program to bolster
the nation's language capabilities.
We watched as our elected officials
lined up to salute the flag and sup-
port the program, appropriately
called the National Defense Foreign
Language Act.
The program was a winner. So
what happened? We learned that
some officials had used programs
for unsavory purposes and that our
colleagues overseas looked askance
at our close connection to the
defense establishment. No longer
could we tolerate the association of
language and defense.
Thus we shifted the rationale for
teaching foreign languages from
defense to education. There was
nothing inherently wrong in doing
so. Nevertheless, language programs
began competing for funds with
other worthy priorities, such as stu-
dent loans and science education. In
addition we lost the crisp precision
of our original story. The new, less
convincing story goes something like
this: study foreign language to learn
about the world, to become disci-
plined, and to reassert US compet-
a --r - -- --- - -, -- v
in our firms who spoke passable
Japanese. So why were we so compet-
itive in the fifties and sixties? Why
did US cars, radios, electronics, and
heavy equipment set the interna-
tional standard? Did more people at
General Motors speak Spanish? Did
IBM officials discuss the virtues of
their technology in fluent Japanese?
Of course not. Competitiveness is a
function of quality and price. Lan-
guage allows us to talk about com-
petitive products, but it does not
make the products more
competitive.
All of this would be more toler-
able if we actually taught students
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who are not language majors to
speak another language. The truth is
we rarely do so. We give our stu-
dents a little grammar, a little vocab-
ulary, and some inadequate training
in the language laboratory. We then
send the fortunate few to a good
program abroad. If they work hard
and avoid other Americans, they
return speaking passable German,
French, Spanish, or whatever as a
result of their immersion in the cul-
ture, not as a result of our university
curriculum.
We the educators are to blame.
We know how to teach foreign lan-
guage, but we refuse to do it right.
Why not? Because doing so would
mean breaking the hammer lock
that literature has on teaching lan-
guage in most US universities. Liter-
ature, which should be the greatest
incentive for language acquisition,
has become the most powerful
inhibitor of language learning.
Literature professors do not like
to teach language, which they
regard as the work of academic
untouchables. Yet they will not give
up language teaching because it
pays for literature studies. So they
hire a few dedicated language pro-
fessionals, saddle them with hostile
and disinterested graduate-student
instructors, pay them a miserable
wage, and deny them tenure. When
effective language teaching does not
result, literature professors com-
plain about the quality of the lan-
guage professionals.
The mere suggestion that we cre-
ate an autonomous department of
language instruction brings down
the combined wrath of literary aca-
demia. The response often takes the
form of a collaborative attack by the
chairs of Spanish, Portuguese,
French, Italian, and German depart-
ments-characters whose previous
relations resembled those of Arab
and Israeli leaders.
Writing a New Story
Why don't we put the graduates of
our language classes through a com-
petency test to discover whether
they speak the language or not?
Because competency testing throws
a scare into most literature estab-
lishments. After all, it is based on
the academically unpopular notion
that language is a relatively straight-
forward skill. The results of such a
test might lead us to reallocate
money away from the four-
hundredth rectification of the
meaning of the "Quijotesque" in
Cervantes's minor novellas.
Deans and other sensitive
administrators have not given up,
however. They have called for the
use of competency testing and the
creation of think tanks for the devel-
opment of language instruction.
One such think tank operates at The
Johns Hopkins School for Advanced
International Studies. Its dedicated
instructors of language are busy
with subversive investigations of new
teaching methods. Complemented
by demonstration projects at partici-
pating universities, this approach
offers a test environment that may
show us the way to improved lan-
guage teaching.
VOICES
FROM
LATIN
AMERICA
ORBIS BOOKS
What should educators do? We
can begin by recognizing that lan-
guage requirements mean nothing
without exit-proficiency require-
ments. We must also recognize that
proficiency requirements cannot be
fulfilled without budgets and with-
out rewards-pay, promotion, and
prestige-commensurate with the
task. Neither the federal government
nor private foundations should give
a dime to any international program
that lacks serious commitment to
language teaching and competency
testing. A benchmark of such com-
mitment, and thus a high priority
for funding, are yearlong programs
of overseas study that incorporate
before-and-after testing.
Educators must listen to the
public. When people do not buy
goods there is usually a reason: the
product is too expensive, it does not
work, or both. The public does not
buy our foreign-language story
because it's too expensive, it does
not teach people how to speak the
language, and it wastes their time. .
H. McKennie Goodpasture
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Insider briefs on people and institutions
shaping Latin American and Caribbean affairs
El Compadre Wins Big
in Bolivian Elections
Carlos Palenque, popularly known
as "El Compadre," led CONDEPA
(Conciencia de Patria) to victory in
the department of La Paz and to a
fourth-place finish nationwide in
the May 1989 presidential election.
His victory in La Paz was remark-
able considering CONDEPA's many
handicaps. The party was founded
only eight months before the elec-
tion. Its candidate, Palenque, was
accused of having close ties to
cocaine king Roberto SuArez, and
his widely watched television station
was closed down by the government.
CONDEPA's showing was enough to
elect Remedios Loza, popularly
known as "La Comadre," as deputy of
La Paz. For the first time an Indian
woman, who still dresses in tradi-
tional garb, will sit in the national
congress.
The Feeling Is Mutual
In the last episode of the Elliott
Abrams-Jim Wright story, former
assistant secretary of state Abrams
called the (now ex-) Speaker of the
House ".impossible." In an exit inter-
view with the Washington Post (June
4), Wright gives his own version.
According to the Post, Wright was
"pleased" his peace efforts on Cen-
tral America won him the "enmity"
of the Reagan administration.
Wright even cited a date, November
13, 1987, when his diplomacy got
"under the skin" of Abrams. On that
day Wright opened his office to
Nicaraguan president Daniel Ortega
as well as to contra leaders.
Edited by Mark B. Rosenberg
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For Your Calendar
The annual Miami Conference on
the Caribbean will be held Novem-
ber 28-December 1. Billed as a
"town meeting on the Caribbean":'
the gathering features leading
Caribbean, US, and Canadian offi-
cials involved in bilateral and multi-
lateral trade. Last year, Caribbean/
Central American Action, the con-
ference's sponsor, made a special
effort to involve Far Eastern trade
representatives. An even higher pro-
file can be expected at this year's
meeting for Japanese and Taiwanese
officials, who may be looking for
new investment outlets.
Heir Apparent?
Edward Seaga, whose Jamaica
Labour Party was defeated in the
general election of February 1989,
has relinquished his shadow cabi-
net's finance portfolio. Replacing
Seaga is Bruce Golding, who served
as construction minister during the
Seaga years. Golding may be the
heir apparent to lead JLP into the
21st century.
Technology Makes It Possible
Radio Havana Cuba is sending a
friendly letter throughout the US to
market its services. According to the
missive, "at the touch of a button"
shortwave listeners can now tune in
on "moderately-priced digital
radios." "Immediate, responsible"
coverage with a "fresh look at the
world [is] available:' Thrown into
the deal are a Radio Havana Cuba
pocket calendar and a listener's
card. The address is Box 7026,
Havana.
Economy by Fax
Expreso, a Peruvian newspaper,
reports ex-economy adviser Daniel
Carbonetto sends advice on manag-
ing Peru's economy from Buenos
Aires to President Alan Garcia.
According to one report, Car-
bonetto follows lengthy phone con-
versations by faxing outlines of
policy measures. Although Garcia is
desperate for advice on managing
the economy, Carbonetto's ideas may
be part of the problem, not the solu-
tion. He was among the handful of
advisers who played a role in Gar-
cia's abortive measure to nationalize
banks-regarded by many as the
major policy error of the president's
economic management efforts.
Lima-by Night
Black humor is now helping Peru-
vians to cope with the nation's deep-
ening economic and social crisis.
One example is a five-page "Begin-
ners Guide to Peru" circulating in
Lima: "The population is about 17
million, of whom about 16.9 million
live in the capital Lima, where they
are employed selling each other
things in the street. The main prod-
ucts of Peru are blank cassettes, car-
rings [piston rings] and snacks (sea-
food [sic]). Lima must once have
been a very fine town-indeed every
traveler who has visited Lima in the
last four hundred years has com-
mented on the fact. Research is
under way to find a traveler so early
[in Peruvian history] that he com-
ments on how fine a city Lima is, but
so far he has not been found. The
capital of Lima is Miraflores [the
affluent suburb]."
INeither Rain nor Sleet...
Nor Tropical Heat...
You can now send express mail pack-
ages to 14 Latin American countries
for $10.75 through the US Postal
Service's international express mail.
One to three-day service is pro-
vided. Federal Express still offers
the best service to the Caribbean: at
almost twice the cost.
Making the Case for Puerto Rico
"Without sustained media coverage
in the US, Puerto Rico has some-
times remained in the shadows. We
believe it's time US opinionmakers
saw Puerto Rico in a new light." So
states the Council for Puerto Rico-
US Affairs, which has opened
offices in New York as a non-profit
organization. The council's board of
directors consists of notables from
the island and the US, including Fer-
nando Agrait and Peter V. Ueber-
roth. A council official, Roberto M.
Soto, writes "Puerto Rico is well
positioned to increase respect and
understanding between the US
and Latin America...and is well
equipped to reinforce the struggle
for democracy and development in
the Caribbean."
A Democratizing District?
According to Mexican policy analyst
Luis Rubio, the Federal District of
Mexico is an anomaly in the nation's
constitutional structure. Although
the district comprises 25% of Mex-
ico's population, its administrators
are not elected officials. Rubio sug-
gests a phased transition to the
direct election of the district's
mayor, or regente.
L
Southern Cone Competition
One of the best-kept secrets about
the British is that they consume a lot
of wine-50 million cases a year.
When the Malvinas conflict rup-
tured Anglo-Argentine trade in
1982, thirsty Brits lost 2 million liters
per year of imported Argentine
wine. Chile is gradually replacing
Argentina as Latin America's lead-
ing exporter of wines to Britain. In
1989 150,000 cases of Chile's finest
will be sold in Britain. The March-
April 1989 US embargo on Chilean
fruit has encouraged Chilean
growers to convert their orchards
and fruit yards into vineyards. But
looming on the horizon is the EEC
of 1992, which may exclude the
import of non-EEC wines.
Try It, You'll Like It
Beleza Tropical: Brazil Classics I
(Fly/Sire Records, 1989) is getting
hot reviews in the US. The pop
music collection features some of
Brazil's best musicians, including
Gilberto Gil, Chico Buarque, and
Maria Bethania.
SELA Via
SELA (Sistema Econ6mico Latino-
americano) permanent secre-
tary Carlos Perez del Castillo
announced in June a proposal to
reduce the nominal value of Latin
America's external debt by 50%. Two
hundred billion dollars in commer-
cial and official debt would be con-
verted into long-term, low-interest
bonds, thus reducing annual debt-
service transfers by up to 75%.
SELA called for a ceiling of 5% on
debt-related international interest
rates.
E
On the Move
Margaret Daly Hayes is now with the
Inter-American Development Bank
as director of public affairs. For-
merly a staffer on the Senate For-
eign Relations Committee and
director of the Washington office of
the Council of the Americas, Hayes's
primary responsibility is to develop a
stronger constituency base for the
bank's president, Enrique Iglesias.
Stephen A. Quick, of the Congres-
sional Joint Economic Committee,
has written "Mexico's Macro-
economic Gamble." Available
through the Columbia-New York
University Consortium on Latin
American Studies, the paper exam-
ines Mexico's new approach to eco-
nomic stabilization and the odds of
its success. The author suggests
there are "few precedents" for suc-
cess in the country's efforts.
Jeanne Robinson is the executive
director ofJamaica's new private-
sector initiative on education, the
ICWI Group Foundation. A former
science educator, Robinson directs
the foundation's efforts to develop
educational programs on business
applications of science and technol-
ogy. The ICWI Group is a consor-
tium of insurance and finance
companies from throughout the
Caribbean.
Aaron Williams is the new director
of AID for the Eastern Caribbean.
Headquartered in Barbados, Wil-
liams is in charge of operations that
extend to Trinidad, Guyana, and
Suriname. His experience with AID
in Costa Rica and Haiti should serve
him well.
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Brazil: Fire in the Forest
by Anthony W. Pereira
uch has been said
about the dimensions
and consequences of
the rapid deforesta-
tion of the Brazilian
Amazon, but little
discussion has
addressed its fundamental causes.
Rarely mentioned are the origins of
the problem in Brazil's agrarian poli-
cies of the last 50 years. Understand-
ing the policy origins of Amazonia's
deforestation is crucial to the
search, in Brazil and worldwide, for
ways of harmonizing demands on
the environment with the need to
implement programs of sustainable
development. The matter of agrar-
ian policy is equally important in
drawing attention to another over-
looked issue: the role of conflict over
land reform in Brazil's continuing
transition from authoritarian to
democratic governance.
Policy Origins of Agrarian Crisis
Contemporary agrarian policy in
Brazil emerged during the country's
Estado Novo (1937-45), a period of
authoritarian rule and state central-
ization. During the Estado Novo,
Anthony W. Pereira is a doctoral
candidate in government at Harvard
University.
Brazil's state leadership, agro-export
elites, and nascent industrialists
forged an alliance that promoted
the restricted unionization of indus-
trial workers but favored the power-
ful rural oligarchy by excluding
rural workers. This arrangement
went unchallenged until the late
1950s, when rural labor organiza-
tions and a supporting cast of
priests, students, lawyers, politi-
cians, and communists began to
demand land and labor reforms. But
the military regime installed in 1964
silenced these demands by imprison-
ing, torturing, and killing peasant
leaders, and by replacing the offi-
cials of rural trade unions with qui-
escent substitutes. After the 1973-74
-I t
and 1979 oil shocks, a skyrocketing
foreign debt exacerbated Brazil's
agrarian problems by intensifying
the state's commitment to large-
scale export agriculture.
During most of the military
period (1964-85) the value of agri-
cultural production grew, albeit at a
pace much below that of the rest of
the economy. Agricultural growth,
which centered on exports such as
cocoa, oranges, soybeans, and
sugar, was based on the commercial-
ization of large estates, or latificn-
dios. This process involved vigorous
state intervention in all phases of
production and marketing, includ-
ing research on seeds and planting
techniques, the expansion of road
II UIll
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and utilities networks, and the sub-
vention of exports through favor-
able exchange rates and guaranteed
prices. Particularly important was
the provision of cheap capital
through a network of state banks;
from 1968 to 1978 rural credit
increased fivefold in real terms.
As the owners of latifitndios
purchased machinery, fertilizer,
pesticides, and other inputs, the
academic debate over whether the
latifcndio was capitalist or feudal
died out. Clearly the latificndio was
capitalist, and large landowners
severed "feudal," patriarchal ties
with the peasantry as if to prove it.
Among the landowners involved
were cattle ranchers, whose
expanded holdings included vast
tracts cleared purely for speculative
purposes. As a result, in the
mid-1980s an estimated 737 million
acres of arable land lay unculti-
vated. Peasants, who were often
unable to obtain credit or other
forms of state assistance, became
displaced as land was concentrated
in the hands of a few.
The displacement of the rural
A * VI SI m III
poor was a prime consequence of
agrarian commercialization. As ten-
ants, sharecroppers, and small
farmers lost land, the ranks of the
agrarian proletariat grew. Yet, in the
absence of adequate job oppor-
tunities on the modernized estates,
the rural poor tended not to stay in
the countryside but to seek employ-
ment in urban zones. For this rea-
son, between 1970 and 1980 the
number of rural poor increased by
no more than 4.3%: some 30 million
people exited the countryside for
urban shantytowns in Sao Paulo,
Rio de Janeiro, and other cities.
Given the export focus of com-
mercialization, another negative
consequence was that Brazil's food
production for the domestic market
decreased. Small farmers producing
staples such as beans, rice, manioc,
and corn lost either their land or
government resources. Thus from
1977 to 1984 food production for
the domestic market fell by 10%,
even as agricultural exports
increased.
Still another negative conse-
quence brings us back to the ques-
allI1
tion of migration. As indicated by
satellite photos of rain-forest fires,
the cities were not the only destina-
tion for rural migrants. Beginning
in the 1970s landless peasants began
to stream into Amazonia. Although
the Instituto Nacional de Coloniza(,do
e Reforma Agrdria (INCRA) began
granting titles to Amazonian land,
millions of people-encouraged by
government slogans and traveling on
government-built roads-arrived to
clear rain-forest land without offi-
cial sanction. Eighty percent of set-
tler farms fail because of the poor
rain-forest soil. Nevertheless the
migration continues, especially to
western Amazonia. The reason is
simple: 10 to 12 million peasants
are landless.
Clearly the settlers cannot be
blamed for wanting to eat. Moreover
they are only one of many causes of
deforestation. There are, for exam-
ple, the hydroelectric dams, such as
Xingu, Tucurui, Altamira, and
scores of others in the planning
stages. The Grande Carajas pig-iron
furnaces, which burn charcoal
made from local wood, cause the
annual loss of 73,000 acres of forest.
Extensive additional damage is
caused by lumber operations and
mining projects, as well as by export
agriculture and the expansion of
cattle ranches. The "development"
policies of the Brazilian state, from
economic planning and the provi-
sion of infrastructure to fiscal sub-
sidies and the maintenance of law
and order, stand at the center of this
agrarian transformation. Because
these policies predate the economic
crisis of the 1980s, Brazil's foreign
debt of $124 billion can share only
part of the blame for their existence.
For the rural poor the upshot is that
such policies push them into a des-
perate quest for survival.
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Worsening rural inequality has
not gone unprotested. In 1983 a
national campaign for land reform
was initiated, spearheaded by the
9.7 million-member Confederagao
Nacional dos Trabalhadores na Agri-
cultura (CONTAG), the Comissdo
Pastoral de Terra of the Catholic
Church, and the Confederagao Nacio-
nal dos Bispos do Brasil. But relations
deteriorated between CONTAG and
the Church groups, and the cam-
paign made little headway with
potential urban allies, such as labor
unions and leftist parties. A rural-
urban alliance is politically crucial
because Brazil is 70% urban and
most of the migration to cities is
probably irreversible.
Lower and middle-class city
dwellers would benefit from agrar-
ian reform, since it promises to
increase the number of farms pro-
ducing for the internal market and
to reduce the cost of food. Nonethe-
less, despite the high volume of
migration from the countryside,
there is faint urban recognition of
this linkage, and awareness of it
could not possibly compete with
political concern over urgent prob-
lems such as employment, housing,
crime, and public services. Another
potential urban benefit is that agrar-
ian reform could lessen the influx
of rural migrants into the painfully
swollen cities. But again, like the
cities themselves, the political
agenda of urban residents is already
crowded. The political rift between
town and country has proved to be
the Achilles' heel of the agrarian
reform movement.
The 1985 Reform Proposal
Following the March 1985 death of
President-elect Tancredo Neves,
shortly after he won the electoral-
college vote in Brazil's first election
of a civilian in 25 years, Vice Presi-
dent Jose Sarney, a long-time sup-
porter of the outgoing military
regime, assumed the presidency. Try-
ing to establish his credibility as a
democratic reformer, Sarney soon
announced a program of land
reform patterned after an aborted
1964 land statute. In May 1985 he
proposed the granting of land to
71 million people by the year 2000,
based on the expropriation of 1 bil-
lion acres of unused and under-
utilized land from latificndios.
Congressional representatives of the
Partido dos Trabalhadores, the Partido
Democrdtico Trabalhista, and, to a
much lesser degree, the ruling Par-
tido do Movimento Democrdtico
Brasileiro backed the proposal.
But Sarney's announcement pro-
voked countermeasures. In July
1985 large landowners formed the
Uniao Democrttica Ruralista (UDR)
to oppose any program that
threatens private landholdings.
Reports by the Brazilian press and
the reformist wing of the Catholic
Church link UDR to 458 assassina-
tions of peasants, rural workers,
indigenous people, and their sup-
porters that took place between Jan-
uary 1985 and June 1987 UDR has
worked as a lobbying group as well.
Joining forces with traditional land-
owner associations, it pressured the
congressional drafters of the new
constitution to prohibit the expro-
priation of land from "productive"
estates. This constitutional measure
crippled the reform plan, since
landlords can classify any tract of
land with a few head of cattle or
some machinery as "productive"
Mounting congressional, mili-
tary, and executive opposition to
land redistribution confirmed suspi-
cions regarding official commitment
to the program. For instance, by
devolving decisions on land expro-
priation to state governments, the
administration further exposed the
reform to the opposition of estate
owners. At almost every step the
owners could block the process of
expropriating and retitling land.
Moreover the provision of com-
pensation to landlords was both
expensive and bureaucratically
cumbersome. In October 1987 the
Sarney administration transferred
authority over the program from
INCRA to the Ministdrio da Reforma
Agrdria e Desenvolvimento (MIRAD).
This transfer led to unsuccessful
protests by CONTAG, which viewed
the shift as a political blow to land
redistribution.
The Guardian Weekly (Manches-
ter, January 29, 1989) reports that by
the end of 1988 Sarney's program
had redistributed just 7% of the
projected acreage of land, and just
4% of the projected number of fam-
ilies had received land. In January
1989 the Sarney administration, in a
cost-cutting measure induced by
Brazil's $70-billion internal debt, for-
mally abolished MIRAD. The agrar-
ian reform was dead, revealing this
irony in Brazil's political transition
to civilian rule: the last military gov-
ernment, that of General Joao
Figuereido (1979-85), redistributed
more land than has the civilian gov-
ernment ofJose Sarney.
The 1989 Presidential Election
A presidential election is sched-
uled for November 15, 1989, exactly
a century after the birth of the Bra-
zilian republic. The first direct pres-
idential election since 1960, it
involves a dozen candidates and
promises to be a watershed in Bra-
zilian politics. Its potential impact
on policies of agrarian reform and
Amazonian conservation, however, is
unclear.
A number of leftist and centrist
parties support land reform, at least
rhetorically. The position of the gov-
erning centrist Partido do Movimento
Democrdtico Brasileiro (PMDB),
whose candidate is Ulysses
Guimaries, is ambivalent. As an
opposition party in the 1970s it was
clearly reformist. But in the 1980s,
as PMDB gained a majority in con-
gress, its reformist commitment
weakened as many politicians from
the pro-military party, the Aliana
Renovadora Nacional (ARENA), and
its successor, the Partido Democrdtico
Social (PDS),joined its ranks. For
instance, of the two PMDB senators
elected in 1986 in the state of Per-
nambuco, one was a large land-
holder and sugar-mill owner who
had previously belonged to ARENA
and PDS. Such politicians were
among the large segment of the
PMDB that voted against the consti-
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tutional measure to permit the
expropriation of "productive"
estate lands.
To PMDB's left, both the Partido
dos Trabalhadores (PT), whose candi-
date is Luis Ignacio da Silva (known
as "Lula"), and the Partido Demo-
crdtico Trabalhista (PDT), whose
candidate is Leonel Brizola, have
pledged-if elected-to enact pro-
grams of agrarian reform. The Par-
tido Social Democrdtico Brasileiro
(PSDB), led by Mario Covas, has
pledged the same. The candidates of
these parties consider the vast tracts
of unused land in latifindios as the
chief agrarian problem and promise
to redistribute those lands to small
farmers.
What differentiates Lula,
Brizola, and Covas is not their
analyses and promises, but rather
the chance that, if elected, they will
fulfill their promises. Of the three,
PT candidate Lula has the clearest
commitment to the rural poor. More
than half of PT's 450,000 members,
many of whom are tied to the pro-
gressive sector of the Catholic
Church, reside in the countryside.
In addition the party has made
recent inroads into the rural trade-
union movement, where it serves as
a rallying point for unofficial, reform-
ist opposition to CONTAG leader-
ship. Finally, PT is linked to the rub-
ber tappers and indigenous people
who seek rain-forest conservation.
Lula reinforced this link by attend-
ing the funeral of party member
Chico Mendes, the assassinated
rubber tapper and environmentalist.
It is doubtful, nevertheless, that
even a PT presidency would accom-
plish significant agrarian reform.
Under the constitution promulgated
in October 1988, all expropriated
land must be paid for in cash and
bonds-a formidable restriction
given the government's fiscal crisis.
Although a two-thirds vote in con-
gress could undo this restriction,
such a vote is improbable in light of
the strong congressional representa-
tion of estate owners.
A more likely scenario is that an
incoming president would restruc-
ture the granting of licenses,
credits, and other subsidies, which
clearly favor agro-export enter-
prises. Because latifindios are
highly dependent on this system,
such changes could simultaneously
decrease the acreage of large land-
holdings and increase the incentives
to smallholders producing for the
domestic market. In recent years the
government, in another cost-cutting
measure, raised its cost of rural
credit, which flows dispropor-
tionately to latifindios. It also pro-
posed the privatization of sugar-
export transactions. A reformist
administration could take further
initiative along these lines to lessen
Brazilian agriculture's glaring
inequalities and export bias.
As for the Amazon Basin, the
electoral platforms of PT's Lula,
PDT's Brizola, PSDB's Covas, and
PMDB's Guimaraes include conser-
vationist agendas. Typical of these
agendas is Brizola's promise to
establish a ministry of the Amazon.
Yet, unless the Brazilian economy
rebounds, no package of vigorous
reforms will prove sufficient. Espe-
cially if the economy enters into
hyperinflation, land will continue as
one of the few safe investments. Sim-
ilarly a stagnant economy will con-
tinue pushing settlers into the rain
forest in search of subsistence.
Most important, the unremitting
pressure of the foreign debt will
reinforce the economy's export ori-
entation. This pressure, moreover,
will continue stimulating the build-
ing of Amazonian dams that could
flood an area of rain forest as large
as Great Britain (The Miami Herald,
July 24, 1989). In sum, conservation
of the Amazon Basin requires not
only serious agrarian and environ-
mental reforms but also debt relief
and a sound, domestically oriented
economy.
Agrarian reform does not
appear on the platform of the Par-
tido da ReconstruCio Nacional's candi-
date, Fernando Collor de Mello, who
in the spring 1989 opinion polls shot
past the leftist candidates Brizola
and Lula. As for environmentalism,
his platform merely seeks interna-
tional aid to enable private Brazilian
conservation organizations to help
run national parks. In the late 1970s
Collor was appointed by the military
to serve as mayor of Macei6, capital
of the small northeastern state of
Alagoas, currently Brazil's third
largest sugar producer. As a mem-
ber of congress in 1985, Collor cast
his electoral-college vote for the
right-wing presidential candidate,
Paulo Maluf. As governor of
Alagoas, his land-reform record is
among the nation's worst. Collor's
ascent in the opinion polls is fueled
by his image as an opponent of polit-
ical corruption and an enemy of
Sarney. Whether or not he can sus-
tain this image, his pledge to
reduce inflation to 3% per month
has struck a clear chord among
the electorate.
A New Political Course?
Collor's popularity demonstrates
that issues of land reform and rain-
forest protection will not be decisive
in November's election. There is rea-
son, nonetheless, for long-term opti-
mism regarding agrarian issues. An
honest election in November and a
peaceful presidential succession
would reestablish the right of the
Brazilians to elect their president.
This right, in turn, would lay the
groundwork for permitting the citi-
zenry to play an active role in shap-
ing the nation's political agenda.
Achievement of the latter should be
the true measure of Brazil's transi-
tion from authoritarian to demo-
cratic rule.
The political power of the rural
oligarchy has frequently blocked the
path to democracy in Brazil. The
oligarchy defeated the 1985 land
reform and is substantially respon-
sible for the environmental destruc-
tion of Amazonia. Yet Brazil has
become overwhelmingly urban and
increasingly industrial. If, in this
setting, electoral mechanisms can
be consolidated, then large land-
owners will eventually find themselves
politically isolated. It is much too
early to say good-bye to the Amazon,
or to the idea of agrarian justice
in Brazil. .
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Colonizing the Amazon
by Anna Luiza Ozorio de Almeida
Since the 1960s Brazil's agri-
cultural frontier has been
expanding into Amazonia.
Migrants from the poverty-
stricken northeast, who in
the 1940s and '50s moved
southward to the Parand
coffee belt, shifted their destination
in the 1960s to the Amazonian terri-
tory of central Brazil. During that
decade the focus of resettlement was
the states of Mato Grosso do Sul and
Goids. In the 1970s the migration
moved deeper into Amazonia via the
states of Mato Grosso, Maranhao,
and Parr. In the 1980s the migratory
flow penetrated deeper into the
region, reaching westernmost states
such as Rond6nia, Acre, and
Roraima.
Not until the completion of the
1990 population census will we know
the true magnitude of this decade's
demographic growth in the Brazilian
Amazon. In the 1970s Pard led the
way in the zone's demographic
expansion, distantly followed by
Rond6nia, Mato Grosso, Acre, and
Roraima. Between 1960 and 1980
the most explosive population
growth occurred not in the rural
areas but in the urban areas of
Amazonia.
Urbanization in the Amazon
Basin occurs for two reasons. First,
agricultural commercialization,
which has given impetus to the
development of large landholdings,
has expelled many Brazilians from
their rural places of origin and from
the rural economy itself. In fact the
agricultural frontier of the 1960s,
Mato Grosso do Sul and Goids,
Anna Luiza Ozorio de Almeida is pro-
fessor of economics and business admin-
istration at the Universidade Federal do
Rio de Janeiro.
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became a zone of rural exodus in
the 1970s. Second, many of the dis-
placed small farmers are attracted
to the Amazon's urban oppor-
tunities in activities such as govern-
ment services, transportation,
retailing, and lodging, which cater
to the region's booming population.
Yet the growth of the Amazon's
rural population has also been
explosive. Hundreds of thousands
of small farmers have entered terri-
tories whose economies formerly
centered on low-density forest
extraction. Many of the farmers har-
vest staple crops (e.g., beans, corn,
manioc, bananas, and coffee) and
raise one or two head of cattle for a
few years, deforesting the land in the
process. Newly arriving entrepre-
neurs then purchase the small plots
or expel the farmers at gun point,
eventually consolidating the col-
lected holdings into speculative
properties, large cattle ranches, or,
rarely, productive agribusinesses.
The displaced farmers move on to
new agricultural frontiers or to the
local townships that are sprouting
throughout the region.
The small farmers who are push-
ing-or being pushed-into Ama-
zonia comprise the same segment of
Brazil's population that previously
moved from place to place, both
in the Amazon Basin and in other
areas. In the 1970s, for instance,
public and private colonization proj-
ects in Amazonia resettled 100,000
small farmers. By the end of the
decade, however, more than one-
third of them had left their plots, as
the concentration of landownership
occurred almost as rapidly within
the colonization projects as outside
them. This pattern continues. Curi-
ously the most successful settlers in
the projects are often the most trav-
eled ones, having bought and sold
several parcels of land-commonly
at a profit-as they moved with the
shifting agricultural frontier. Nei-
ther landownership nor protection
from expulsion, both of which
the projects provide, has proved
sufficient to bind these farmers
to one locale.
The mobility of the small farmers
is related to the low yield, land-
extensive nature of their agricul-
tural practices. Even in the colo-
nization projects, farmers deforest
their land and abandon it after only
two or three years of harvests, and
then repeat the cycle on other land
within the same project or else-
where. Rarely do the farmers prac-
tice techniques of land conserva-
tion, such as crop and land rotation.
Low yield, land-extensive agricul-
ture is slow to die on the frontier,
where cheap, uncultivated land
is plentiful.
This economic logic becomes
apparent in comparing public and
private colonization projects. In the
public projects where, especially in
Para, land is cheap and plentiful,
60-70% of the deforested land lies
not fallow but abandoned. In the
private projects where, especially in
Mato Grosso, land is three times
more expensive, only 30% of the
deforested land lies abandoned. The
relationship between the real price
of land and yield per hectare sug-
gests that the rate of deforestation
would decrease, and the rate of con-
servation correspondingly increase,
if the real price of land were sharply
raised.
The problem is not that simple,
however, because access to cheap
land substantially improves the
income of small farmers. Farmers
who purchase the inexpensive lands
of the public projects fare signifi-
cantly better (as measured by indices
such as income per worker, indebt-
edness, and investment/yield ratio)
than do those who purchase the
more expensive lands of the private
projects. In both cases, though,
average earnings in the Amazon's
colonization projects are 60%
higher than those of Brazil's urban
workers.
This difference in average earn-
ings indicates that massive migra-
tion into the Amazon region is not
likely to diminish in the near future.
As long as Brazil's economic crisis
persists, rural migrants will con-
tinue to extend the agricultural
frontier. The alternative, after all, is
to try their luck among the swelling
ranks of the urban un- and under-
employed. In an economy charac-
terized by chronic inflation, the
profitability of land speculation will
continue to pull into Amazonia the
small farmers who are expelled from
other zones by the economically and
politically powerful large land-
owners. Insofar as small and large
farmers alike regard land as plenti-
ful, conservationist practices will not
be implemented and land-extensive
agriculture will continue to feed
deforestation. u
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Declarations on the Amazon
Speech on"Our Nature"
byJose Sarney, President of Brazil
Brasilia
April 6, 1989
The sum of the actions we are set-
ting in motion today demonstrates
the intensity of our commitment to
solving the ecological problem, in
the face of both our limited
resources and the campaign of sci-
entific falsehoods and disinforma-
tion about what is going on in our
territory.
Brazil has resisted colonial
exploitation, the exploitation of its
foreign debt and its mineral
resources, and the virulent criticism
meant to silence its rightful voice in
world affairs. The international
press has been denouncing, in
alarmist fashion, the deforestation
of Amazonia. It is not my adminis-
tration that is being judged, but
rather the very process of Brazilian
nation-building. Our just indigna-
tion comes not from the president
but from the Brazilian nation. The
only thing we may be guilty of is our
insistence on being free. The inter-
national community would like us to
allow the superpowers or interna-
tional organizations to tell us how to
defend what we already accept as
our duty to defend.
We are in the midst of a transi-
tion to democracy. It is ironic that,
during all the years of darkness, the
international community was silent
about the environmental problem.
And now, with everything else, they
blame Brazil for polluting the
atmosphere.
We, who are developing, who are
underdeveloped or poor, don't have
the forces to destroy the Earth.
Sadly this tragic and infernal capac-
ity does exist: it lies in the hands of
those who hold unbelievable atomic
arsenals of destruction. They are the
ones who are putting ozone into the
atmosphere and opening "holes" for
ultraviolet penetration. It is they
who, through millions of tons of
industrial waste, heat up the
atmosphere.
We cannot accept the developed
world's manipulation of the ecology
issue to restrict Latin America's
autonomy and progress. While we
invite international assistance, we
cannot accept conditions that
exploit both nature and the people
who suffer from the most damaging
of all forms of pollution-the pollu-
tion of poverty.
We are prepared to prevent the
ruination of the Amazon from wors-
ening the global environment. We
are ready to discuss and find solu-
tions as long as our right to manage
our territory and to make decisions
is respected. But the developed
world must recognize its obligation
to take similar measures-to pre-
vent acid rain and other forms of
atmospheric pollution, to avoid
damaging the ozone layer, to end
nuclear peril, and to preserve
national forests throughout the
world.
If the world wants to help us to
preserve the Amazon, then it should
help us to reforest the damaged
areas without charging for scientific
assistance. It should transfer the
technology without cost. It should
not try to turn ecology into a busi-
ness through either the foreign debt
or commercialization. Let us gather
up the stones being hurled at us and
use them to pave a path of sincerity
and cooperation. .
(Translated by Alan Kobrin)
Press Conference
by Paiakan Kayap6, Spokesperson
for the Kayap6 Indians
Washington, DC
February 3, 1988
The Amazon region is being
destroyed. Its lands and people are
being lost. The forest-the very basis
Editor's Note: Each declaration is
based on edited excerpts of original
statements.
of Indian life-is fast disappearing.
What has happened to the
Indian? As an Indian I worry about
my people. I worry, too, about the
fate of the rain forest and the land.
Without these vital resources the
Indians of the Amazon will cease to
exist.
I went to speak with the Tucurui
Indians, whose lands are threatened
by government-built dams. To those
about to lose their homes to the res-
ervoirs, the reaction is universally
hostile. The best agricultural land is
near the river. So is the best hunting.
Needless to say, the fishing on which
so many Indians depend will also be
eliminated. As for the Carajits
Indians, whose villages have already
been flooded, there was no one left
to ask. They had lost their land, and
thus lost everything.
We Indians are unanimously
opposed to the building of dams in
the Amazon region. We must pre-
serve our forest, and we must pre-
serve our cultures. Without our
forest our culture cannot survive.
And without out culture there is no
reason to live. .
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Open Letter to
President Sarney
The Group of 100
April 3, 1989
We, artists and writers of Latin
America, believe the historic respon-
sibility for the destruction of the
Amazon jungle is great, and future
generations of Latin Americans will
not forgive you for not doing all in
your power to avoid it. Our coun-
tries, and yours in particular, cannot
be absent from the decisions being
taken in the world to protect the nat-
ural patrimony of humanity.
We Latin Americans would like
to see you, for your love of national
sovereignty, defend the Amazon
from local and foreign pillages, as
well as from those who, in exchange
for an irredeemable foreign debt,
are willing to transform the lungs of
the world into a wasteland-without
even fully paying the debt!
Mr. President, we believe it is
regrettable that member countries
of the Treaty of Amazon Coopera-
tion support Brazil in its eco- and
ethnocidal politics. If our govern-
ments are individually incompetent
to defend and conserve their ethnic
riches and the animals and vegeta-
tion of our tropical forests, then the
UN should take charge of them, and
an international court should review
and punish these crimes against
ecological integrity.
Signed by: Adolfo Bioy Casares,
Olga Orozco, Manuel Puig, Ernesto
Sdbato (Argentina); Isabel Allende,
Jose Donoso, Nicanor Parra (Chile);
Fernando Botero, Gabriel Garcia
M6rquez (Colombia); Guillermo
Cabrera Infante (Cuba); Luis Cardoza
y Arag6n, Augusto Monterroso
(Guatemala); Manuel Alvarez Bravo,
Homero Aridjis, Feliciano Bijar,
Fernando Cisarman, Gabriel Figueroa,
Carlos Fuentes, Mathias Goeritz,
Eduardo Matos Moctezuma, Ofelia
Medina, Carlos Monsivdis, Elena
Poniatowska, Ivdn Restrepo, Rufino
Tamayo (Mexico); Mario Vargas Llosa
(Peru);Juan Carlos Onetti (Uruguay);
Arturo Uslar Pietri (Venezuela). .
Ecological Plea to President Sarney
by Homero Aridjis (Mexico),
President of the Group of 100
June 5, 1989
There is not a writer or artist among
us who is not concerned about the
fate of the trees in his or her own
country. We also understand that to
facilitate forest survival, our com-
patriots must reduce their voracious
appetite for tropical hardwoods and
hamburger meat.
The issue is not to prevent devel-
opment in your country, but to put
an end to the skewed relationship
between developed and Third World
nations, whereby the latter annually
export $6 billion of raw timber and
board and import $10 billion of
processed wood products. Projects
must be avoided that benefit only
those few who enjoy political and
economic power and that tend to
convert traditional inhabitants into
pariahs. Conservation and sustain-
able development must be emphasized.
For these reasons we, artists and
writers from four continents, back
the April 3 declaration by 28 Latin
American intellectuals.
Signed by more than 200 intellec-
tuals from Africa, Asia, Europe, and
the Americas. a
Brazilian Campaign for the Defense
and Development of the Amazon
by Orlando Valverde, President
March 1989
The Amazon's deforestation is pri-
marily the responsibility of those
groups-mainly Brazilians but for-
eigners as well-that have benefited
most from government incentives.
At the center of such destruction is
the government itself, which seems
to consider the criminal destruction
of the forest as an "improvement"
of the region. Likewise standing at
the center are cattle and farming
projects, lumber and mining com-
panies, poachers of valuable skins
and furs, gold prospectors, drug
traffickers, and others who care only
about earning a profit.
Amazonia's hydroelectric poten-
tial sparks enthusiasm among those
responsible for Brazil's energy sup-
ply, who are rarely disposed to envi-
ronmentalism. And not to be
overlooked are those groups that
seek to turn the Indians into a sub-
missive, cheap labor force.
There is no doubting the legit-
imacy of international concern over
the catastrophic consequences the
deforestation of Amazonia is caus-
ing Brazil and the world. But the
Brazilian Amazon is the rightful
possession of the Brazilian people.
The sovereignty of the Brazilian
state over the lands within its
boundaries cannot legitimately be
called into question. It is up to us,
the people of Brazil, to repudiate
outside interference. Yet Brazil must
recognize the validity of the criti-
cism. In fact such criticism origi-
nally came from Brazilian scientists
in Brazilian research institutes. We
Brazilians must demand from our
government a stop to the crimes
being committed against the Ama-
zon and its people, as well as against
the entire nation.
Brazilian policy must implement
the 1978 Treaty of Amazon Cooper-
ation, signed by all the countries of
continental Amazonia. Nevertheless,
policy for the defense and develop-
ment of our Amazon must be for-
mulated for Brazilians and by
Brazilians. Our Amazon is an inte-
gral part of the indivisible Brazilian
homeland. .
(Translated by Alan Kobrin)
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Redefining Soviet Foreign Policy
by Alexei Izyumov and Andrei Kortunov
hat role does the
USSR play in the
modern world? Has
its foreign policy
contributed to ful-
filling its mission?
These questions
are involved in the intense discus-
sions of sociopolitical problems
within the USSR, as well as in the
elaboration of its domestic and inter-
national strategies for the future.
The emergence of glasnost and self-
criticism made Soviet citizens realize
that the international image of the
USSR was declining. The technology
gap between the USSR and other
industrial countries was widening,
and we began to recognize a lack of
realism in traditional domestic
appraisals of our policies in the eco-
nomic and social spheres. These
problems, which the world public
was well aware of, came as a shock to
people who had long regarded the
USSR as a symbol and model of
socialism.
As has happened more than
once in the country's history, some
of the most ardent optimists
plunged into desperate pessimism.
Alexei Izyumov is senior researcher at
the Institute of the United States and
Canada of the USSR Academy of Sci-
ences. Andrei Kortunov is head of the
Section for International Security
Studies at the Institute of the United
States and Canada of the USSR Acad-
emy of Sciences.
It is now claimed not only in the
West but in the USSR as well that
the nation is becoming a second-
rate power, a "developing country
with an A-bomb." Self-criticism is
turning into self-castigation, and the
recognition of mistakes is turning
into a total negation of Soviet
achievements.
This nihilistic attitude is no less
dangerous than the mindless opti-
mism of the past. Thus it is urgent
to undertake an objective and com-
prehensive analysis of the USSR's
role in the world, and to appraise
the strong and weak points in our
foreign-policy potential. In addition
it is important to realize the inher-
ent limits of Soviet influence in the
world and their relationship to the
nation's economic development.
Foreign Policy and Economy
It is no secret the foreign-policy dif-
ficulties of socialist countries in the
1980s, including those of the USSR,
are intimately linked to the slowing
impetus of their economic develop-
ment. The West's attempts to erode
the socialist bloc's military, political,
and ideological influence are largely
based on this fact. The interplay of
domestic economy and foreign pol-
icy has long been ignored in the
USSR. Yet a brief review of Soviet
history underscores its importance.
The dynamic development of the
Soviet economy in the 1920s and
'30s, when its rate of industrial
expansion reached 20-30% per year,
undergirded the country's growing
international prestige. This eco-
nomic dynamism was dramatic in
view of the Great Depression in the
West. After World War II the West,
impressed by the pace of Soviet eco-
nomic and scientific progress, began
to seriously ponder the possibility of
a socialist victory in the economic
competition with capitalism.
Nevertheless, economic dyna-
mism alone does not provide a satis-
factory explanation for the rapid
consolidation of the USSR's global
influence in the postwar years. The
USSR was not the only country forg-
ing ahead. In fact Japan and many
western European countries out-
paced the USSR's economic develop-
ment in the 1950s and '60s.
The success of Soviet foreign
policy in developing countries in the
1960s and '70s was only in part due
to the rapid growth of its economy.
Much more important was the surge
of national liberation movements in
the Third World, the attractiveness
of Marxist-Leninist ideology to such
movements, and Soviet military aid
to the fighting peoples. Thus the
success of Soviet foreign policy
revolved around the nation's military
power-including its budgetary
emphasis on military development
and foreign relations-and to its
social goals and catchy slogans for
the masses. For a long time, then,
the USSR carried out a vigorous for-
eign policy based on powerful mili-
tary and ideological resources but
on a somewhat limited foundation.
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This situation could not last
forever. Since the mid-1970s the
rate of Soviet economic growth has
decreased. The USSR has been fall-
ing further behind the US in the
efficient use of primary materials
and energy resources. The most tell-
ing fact, however, is the widening
US-USSR gap in science and tech-
nology, which translates into lagging
Soviet standards of living.
Soviet stagnation in production,
science, and technology has weak-
ened the country's military capacity,
as frequently mentioned by the the
Soviet military establishment. NATO
experts-who are hardly inclined to
underestimate Soviet military might
-observe that as of the mid-1980s
the USSR was on par with the US in
only five of 20 sectors on military
technology. Equally obvious is the
negative impact of Soviet economic
problems on the international pres-
tige of Marxist ideology, as well as on
the political orientation and influ-
ence of communist and national
democratic movements worldwide.
Thus, with perestroika in Soviet
economy and society under way, the
Western strategy of economically
wearing down the USSR acquires
particular significance. The Western
strategy is to impede and, if possi-
ble, reverse the process of peres-
troika, thereby frustrating Soviet
attempts to fortify the domestic
underpinnings of its international
power.
Who Gains from
"Neo-Globalism"?
Western, and above all US, attempts
to intensify geopolitical rivalry with
the USSR are another facet of the
strategy to undermine Soviet inter-
national power. The US does so by
relying on its impressive techno-
logical, commercial, and financial
advantages, as well as on its unequal
economic relations with developing
countries.
In providing aid to progressive
regimes in the developing world the
USSR cannot count on recouping
its expenditures. From an eco-
nomic standpoint, such aid is simply
unprofitable. Neither is Soviet
military and economic assistance to
the developing world always profit-
able from a political standpoint.
In the 1980s staunch Soviet allies
such as Angola, Mozambique, and
Ethiopia began actively seeking
political and economic support from
the West. The West not only shifted
the main burden of sustaining
"political stability" in these countries
onto the USSR but managed to
derive economic benefits from this
stability. Sometimes the situation
has been ridiculous: in Angola,
for example, Cuban troops often
defended installations of American
oil corporations from attacks by
UNITA gangs financed by the
US itself.
The intended outcomes of Soviet
economic and military assistance
to developing countries are often
restricted to the period of the
struggle for power and to the first
years of the progressive new state's
existence. During the subsequent
period of economic development,
young states increasingly turn to the
West, with the expected political
consequences. Experience shows
this trend can be reversed only if the
USSR renders large-scale aid,
tantamount to the gratuitous
subsidy of the economic formu-
lations of such countries.
These problems were less
pressing in the 1960s and '70s when
the USSR primarily supported left-
wing opposition forces in developing
countries and the US was the main
guarantor of the status quo. In the
1980s the roles have changed, with
the USSR supporting the ruling
national-democratic regimes and the
US attempting to undermine them.
The US skillfully exploits the fact
that in "low-intensity conflicts" it is
much cheaper to support guerrillas
than the government. Not surpris-
ingly, then, the concepts of "new glo-
balism" and "low-intensity conflicts"
have become popular among US lead-
ers. The conflict in Afghanistan is a
graphic illustration of the "economic
efficiency" of the US approach. The
US spent, in supporting the Afghan
antigovernment forces, six to eight
times less per year than did the USSR
on military operations in Afghan-
istan. Western estimates indicate that
approximately the same ratio of
American and Soviet expenditures
occurs in conflicts involving
Nicaragua, Kampuchea, Ethiopia,
and Angola.
Consequently the USSR bears a
much heavier burden of military aid
than does the US. According to
international statistics, in the
mid-1980s the volume of economic
and military aid to developing coun-
tries (Vietnam and Cuba included)
amounted to 1.4% of Soviet GNP,
while the corresponding US figure
was less than 0.3%.
Meanwhile, the US is campaign-
ing to discredit Soviet aid by
pointing to its military focus, its
political "strings"' and its minimal
scientific and technical content. US
estimates show economic aid
accounts for less than 10% of the
volume of the Soviet aid to develop-
ing countries, while for the US this
figure stands at about 40%.
Thus it has become increasingly
difficult for the USSR to compete
with the Western countries in the
Third World. Direct or indirect
Soviet involvement in "low-intensity
conflicts," as well as more general
attempts to deploy the Soviet armed
forces in the Third World can only
exacerbate the difficulties.
The Soviet Response
The current shape of international
politics demands the USSR look for
new ways to repulse the global
imperialist offensive. Two options
are apparent.
The first option is that the USSR
compensate for its weakening
economy by increasing its budgetary
allocations to foreign policy and to
the military, which implies "holding
the position at any cost until the
reinforcements arrive." The second
option is that of rejuvenating the
economy and thereby buttressing
the economic foundations of foreign
policy, that is, "retreating to the
earlier position in order to cut losses
and gather strength."
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Until the replacement of the
nation's leadership in 1985, the first
approach characterized Soviet
foreign relations. It attempted to
compensate for domestic stagnation
by implementing a vigorous foreign
policy. Inevitably this approach
produced stagnation in the Soviet
economy, society, and politics, and it
restricted the success of Soviet
foreign policy. Since 1985, however,
the second, and more realistic,
approach has been coming to the
fore. The final choice, nevertheless,
has yet to be made. In this respect it
is advisable to examine the possible
consequences of these alternatives.
First, it is hardly possible to
revert from the current "opening"
of Soviet society to the previous
mode of "Iron Curtain" secrecy.
Further, the USSR is at a decided
economic disadvantage relative to
the US, Western Europe, and Japan.
NATO's economic indices are 2.5
better than those of the Warsaw
Treaty Organization, while the
indices of NATO and Japan
combined are 3.2 times better. The
West, moreover, has access to the
growing economic reserve
represented by the "new capitalist"
countries emerging from the
underdeveloped world. The USSR
has access to no such reserves.
Second, the economy's limita-
tions require that the nation's leader-
ship clearly define Soviet economic
interests abroad and examine the
pros and cons of international initia-
tives. In other words, Soviet foreign
policy must introduce the criteria of
"cost-accounting" and "self-financ-
ing." In particular the gratuitous
subsidizing of some of our Third
World allies should be replaced by
aid linked to programs designed to
make them more economically via-
ble. Perhaps socialist countries
should establish an organization
similar in purpose to the IME
Establishments of the Council for
Mutual Economic Assistance, for
instance, could be useful.
Third, Soviet foreign policy in
the underdeveloped world must sys-
tematically counter US attempts to
entangle the USSR in new conflicts,
thereby saddling the USSR with
additional commitments and further
scattering its resources. The USSR
needs to adopt a doctrine that allows
it the room to step back from poten-
tial new Third World commitments
in the interests of restructuring its
economy and making more attrac-
tive the socialist path of develop-
ment. Along the same lines the
USSR needs to become more cau-
tious and pragmatic in identifying
its geopolitical interests and goals
throughout the world, the purpose
being to harmonize its actions with
the country's economic potential
and international priorities.
Fourth, not only Marxist-
Leninist theory but also recent his-
tory contradicts the notion that the
USSR must deploy its armed forces
to "counteract imperialist expan-
sionism"' In the 1960s-the period of
most rapid development of national
liberation movements and socialist
ideology in the Third World-the
Soviet armed forces did not perform
this role. In contrast, by the
mid-1970s, when the Soviet military
did assume the role, the Third World
unequivocally swung towards cap-
italist development.
Socialism neither can nor should
be a "guarantor" of those regimes in
developing countries that do not
enjoy widespread social support and
are unable to defend themselves.
Attempting to be such a guarantor
involves the wasting of scarce
resources and the discrediting of
the Third World regimes in ques-
tion. In the final count, moreover,
the outcome of the competition
between socialism and capitalism
will be decided not in Nicaragua or
Afghanistan but in the world's cen-
ters of socialism and capitalism.
The USSR's mistakes in the
underdeveloped world have been
costly. Glasnost in foreign policy is
the primary guarantee that the
USSR will avoid such mistakes in
the future. .
Editor's Note: Edited version of an
article published in the Soviet journal
International Affairs, no. 8 (1988).
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Perestroika and Central America
by Rafael Angel Calder6n
about increased contact
between the USSR and
Latin America. Soviet for-
eign minister Sched-
vardnaze's tour through
Latin America in the fall of
1987 and the Moscow visits of Presi-
dents Raul Alfonsin of Argentina in
inclination to promote class struggle
and "revolutionary" violence. A
principal obstacle to detente and
peace in Central America and the
Caribbean is the Cuban govern-
ment's Marxist orthodoxy. Cuba's
orthodoxy rejects perestroika and
considers the new era of detente an
opportunity to continue pursuing
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the Marxist governments of the area
are not yet employing the language
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the contradiction between Gor-
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Castro's "old thinking:' between the
former's inclination to negotiate
regional conflicts and the latter's
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the strategic Soviet-Cuban alliance
intact. If Gorbachev does so, then he
likely would bet on democratization
in the USSR and hard-line regimes
in Cuba and Nicaragua. The Soviet
bloc would employ a two-prong pol-
icy, with the USSR maintaining for-
mal state-to-state relations, while
the Cuban and Nicaraguan govern-
ments maintain informal relations
with insurgent movements in coun-
tries like El Salvador, Guatemala, .
and Honduras. In this scenario the
USSR would tone down its relations
with Nicaragua, providing military
aid indirectly through Cuba.
Gorbachev's statements, in his
book Perestroika, cause considerable
anxiety among Central Americans.
For example, when he writes, "We
sympathize with liberation move-
ments ... ," is he referring to Soviet
support for movements like El Sal-
vador's Farabundo Marti Front for
National Liberation? Similarly, when
cnIIPr 1e hat "... what has hap-
ragua demonstrates
pected to happen in
s is he pnrpsin
rds the formation of
as in Central America?
ments, as well as Soviet
Nicaragua and to the
surgency, have led to
arding the spread of
ountries bordering
. In The Grand Fail-
and Death of Commu-
entieth Century (1989),
zinski writes, "In the
RS ommunism may have
cts in Central America
Mexico than elsewhere.
ists there can take
the anti-American,
d radical impulses of
rtions both of the
ntsia and peasantry"
S. -, . zinski does not seem to
believe in the expansionist will of the
Soviets, although he has reason to
acknowledge the revolutionary
adventurism of Cuban and
Nicaraguan leaders.
Rodolfo Cerdas Cruz of Costa
Rica points out, "Opportunist tar-
gets will continue to be a temptation
for the CPSU [Communist Party of
the Soviet Union] leadership, but
they will probably tend to be much
more selective and to weigh up situ-
ations more realistically" (Journal of
Latin American Studies, February
1989, p. 12). Cerdas hints at some
kind of Soviet interference in the
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Until the replacement of the
nation's leadership in 1985, the first
approach characterized Soviet
foreign relations. It attempted to
compensate for domestic stagnation
by implementing a vigorous foreign
policy. Inevitably this approach
produced stagnation in the Soviet
economy, society, and politics, and it
restricted the success of Soviet
foreign policy. Since 1985, however,
the second, and more realistic,
approach has been coming to the
fore. The final choice, nevertheless,
has yet to be made. In this respect it
is advisable to examine the possible
consequences of these alternatives.
First, it is hardly possible to
revert from the current "o- '~" -"
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ble. Perhaps socialist countries
should establish an organization
similar in purpose to the IME
Establishments of the Council for
Mutual Economic Assistance, for
instance, could be useful.
Third, Soviet foreign policy in
the underdeveloped world must sys-
tematically counter US attempts to
entangle the USSR in new conflicts,
thereby saddling the USSR with
additional commitments and further
scattering its resources. The USSR
needs to adopt a doctrine that allows
it the room to step back from poten-
tial new Third World commitments
in the interests of restructuring its
economy and making more attrac-
tive the socialist path of develop-
ment. Along the same lines the
USSR needs to become more cau-
tious and pragmatic in identifying
its geopolitical interests and goals
throughout the world, the purpose
being to harmonize its actions with
the country's economic potential
and international priorities.
Fourth, not only Marxist-
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the outcome of the competition
between socialism and capitalism
will be decided not in Nicaragua or
Afghanistan but in the world's cen-
ters of socialism and capitalism.
The USSR's mistakes in the
underdeveloped world have been
costly. Glasnost in foreign policy is
the primary guarantee that the
USSR will avoid such mistakes in
the future. a
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Perestroika and Central America
by Rafael Angel Calder6n
about increased contact
between the USSR and
Latin America. Soviet for-
eign minister Sched-
vardnaze's tour through
Latin America in the fall of
1987 and the Moscow visits of Presi-
dents Rail1 Alfonsin of Argentina in
October 1986, Julio Maria San-
guinetti of Uruguay in March 1988,
and Jose Sarney of Brazil in October
1988 have given rise to unprece-
dented commercial, technological,
and cultural accords. Simul-
taneously the Soviets have encour-
aged democratization, Contadora
negotiations, and "independent"
foreign policies, especially for Mex-
ico and Argentina. Nevertheless, the
"positive" consequences of peres-
troika for the Soviet people, for Asia,
Africa, and Europe, and even for
some Latin American states, stand
in sharp contrast to the conse-
quences of perestroika for Central
America.
The Central American Challenge
As in the 1970s, detente has not
reached Central America and the
Caribbean. Indeed, the political
actors of Central America and the
Caribbean continue to be immersed
in the dialectics of the Cold War, and
the Marxist governments of the area
are not yet employing the language
of perestroika. The peoples of Cen-
tral America are anxiously observing
the contradiction between Gor-
bachev's "new thinking" and Fidel
Castro's "old thinking," between the
former's inclination to negotiate
regional conflicts and the latter's
inclination to promote class struggle
and "revolutionary" violence. A
principal obstacle to detente and
peace in Central America and the
Caribbean is the Cuban govern-
ment's Marxist orthodoxy. Cuba's
orthodoxy rejects perestroika and
considers the new era of detente an
opportunity to continue pursuing
expansionism.
Unfortunately the Nicaraguan
government of Daniel Ortega has
displayed numerous signs of adher-
ence to Cuban Stalinism. A Cuban-
Nicaraguan equation has been
formed, clinging to the traditional
dogmas of Marxism-Leninism, and
anxious to bring about new military
victories. Further, Gorbachev's visit
to Havana in April 1989 revealed
that Soviet leadership is disposed to
tolerate Castro's revolutionary
intransigence as a means of keeping
the strategic Soviet-Cuban alliance
intact. If Gorbachev does so, then he
likely would bet on democratization
in the USSR and hard-line regimes
in Cuba and Nicaragua. The Soviet
bloc would employ a two-prong pol-
icy, with the USSR maintaining for-
mal state-to-state relations, while
the Cuban and Nicaraguan govern-
ments maintain informal relations
with insurgent movements in coun-
tries like El Salvador, Guatemala, .
and Honduras. In this scenario the
USSR would tone down its relations
with Nicaragua, providing military
aid indirectly through Cuba.
Gorbachev's statements, in his
book Perestroika, cause considerable
anxiety among Central Americans.
For example, when he writes, "We
sympathize with liberation move-
ments ... "' is he referring to Soviet
support for movements like El Sal-
vador's Farabundo Marti Front for
National Liberation? Similarly, when
he assures us that "... what has hap-
pened in Nicaragua demonstrates
what can be expected to happen in
other countries;' is he expressing
sympathy towards the formation of
new Nicaraguas in Central America?
Such statements, as well as Soviet
military aid to Nicaragua and to the
Salvadoran insurgency, have led to
skepticism regarding the spread of
perestroika to countries bordering
the Caribbean. In The Grand Fail-
ure: The Birth and Death of Commu-
nism in the Twentieth Century (1989),
Zbigniew Brzezinski writes, "In the
near future, Communism may have
better prospects in Central America
and perhaps Mexico than elsewhere.
Marxist-Leninists there can take
advantage of the anti-American,
nationalist, and radical impulses of
significant portions both of the
local intelligentsia and peasantry"
(p. 222). Brzezinski does not seem to
believe in the expansionist will of the
Soviets, although he has reason to
acknowledge the revolutionary
adventurism of Cuban and
Nicaraguan leaders.
Rodolfo Cerdas Cruz of Costa
Rica points out, "Opportunist tar-
gets will continue to be a temptation
for the CPSU [Communist Party of
the Soviet Union] leadership, but
they will probably tend to be much
more selective and to weigh up situ-
ations more realistically" (Journal of
Latin American Studies, February
1989, p. 12). Cerdas hints at some
kind of Soviet interference in the
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Panamanian crisis: "The Soviets
appear to be preparing ... for a pos-
sible settlement in Central America,
with the Panamanian situation ...
now working in their favor."
Along the same lines, US analyst
Irving Louis Horowitz mentions
increased Cuban participation in
Latin American military activities
following the Angolan accords,
which call for the departure of
Cuban troops from that country.
According to Horowitz, "Havana
also tends towards closer relations
with Noriega, the Panamanian
strong man, and towards active
intervention in the internal affairs
of El Salvador, Honduras and, of
course, Nicaragua" (El Nuevo Herald
[Miami], April 29, 1989).
Grounds for Optimism?
As Democrats and Christians, we
should cling to the hope that the
impact of glasnost and perestroika in
Central America and the Caribbean
will foster an ambiance of peace,
d6tente, democracy, and develop-
ment. In this respect the extension
of perestroika to Central America
would initiate a number of pro-
cesses: democratization and glasnost
in Cuba and Nicaragua; a negoti-
ated settlement of the regional con-
flict; the suspension of military aid
to insurgents; the reincorporation
of a reformed Cuba within the inter-
American system; and the strength-
ening of economic, commercial, dip-
lomatic, and cultural ties with the
Soviet Union. In such a context of
peace and cooperation, a substan-
tial reduction in defense costs for
Cuba and Nicaragua would become
viable. The latter would allow the
Soviets to reduce their subsidies to
those countries, thereby bolstering
plans to restructure the Soviet econ-
omy. Finally, the extension of peres-
troika to Central America would
create a climate favorable to a
Social-Christian foreign policy,
which is dedicated to the defense of
liberty, peace, justice, and
democracy. .
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Debt, Drugs, Democracy, Central America, and the Environment -
70 leaders speak out on the issues facing our Hemisphere
The Americas in 1989:
Consensus for Action
A Report of the Inter-American Dialogue
Under the auspices of The Aspen Institute
"An outstanding contribution to the policymaking process"
Rep. Lee Hamilton, House Foreign Affairs Committee
"The only sensible alternative"
The Miami Herald
"[A] model approach for foreign policy anywhere"
St. Louis Post Dispatch
The Inter-American Dialogue provides a vital channel for communication between concerned citizens from the United
States, Latin America, Canada, and the Caribbean. Consensus for Action has been hailed byleaders of both U.S. political
parties, and endorsed by newspapers throughout the United States. For policy-makers concerned with inter-American
affairs, it is required reading. For students of Latin America, it provides a concise overview of the major hemispheric
issues and concrete recommendations for tackling them.
$5 per copy paperback, $4 per copy bulk rate available for classroom use and organizations. Contact:
The Inter-American Dialogue, Suite 1070, 1333 New Hampshire Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20036, (202) 466-6410
0 '
t-V
: : i : --;:  -
n
k~4FAI rii:I~Iu I ~~JE I~!k~EiI 5ij ~I~!iL~ ImU W~ i~3AI
Soviet
Union
United States
Total I Soviet Union I United States IWestern Europe IEastern Europe I China
_ossa MIca
nnmini. n Ron
1n
11N rAan
Adapted from Statistical Abstract of Latin America, Vol. 26 (1986). See graph above left.
dE*INbfhhN^"tin.E..p vr.,, w- .,a
Recipient Others
9
:=~:::::c~::~rn::;::~ : : 3 ~,,~::gr~,l::~~~,:
~~l~~~~~~a;~:xs,~::::~i::a:::::~~s: :i~---~
I E
rn
I ~nc I __U
<an
Features: Superpowers and Latin America
Bordering on Consensus: US Policy
by Gilbert W. Merkx
Should Washington rethinkits policy toward LatinAmerica? With the adventof the Bush administration,several policy associationsin the US authored pro-posals to change Washing-
ton's relations with its southern
neighbors. The surprising feature of
these proposals is that, despite
diverse political points of departure,
they substantially converge in their
recommendations for a new US
agenda in Latin America.
PACCA
Policy Alternatives for the Carib-
bean and Central America (PACCA)
is an association of left-to-liberal
scholars and policymakers that
seeks "democratic alternatives" to
US regional policy. The premise of
PACCA's recommendations is that
the US has brought neither peace
nor development to the Caribbean
and Central America. In taking
issue with the national security,
anticommunist thrust of US action,
PACCA interprets the regional
crisis in terms of "sharp inequal-
ities between poor majorities
and wealthy elites" (The Alterna-
tive in Brief, Washington, DC,
1988, p. 1).
PACCAs Central American pro-
posals seek not only an end to US
military intervention and military
aid but support for national, negoti-
ated solutions in El Salvador and
Guatemala and for democratic elec-
tions throughout the isthmus.
PACCA also seeks massive US-led
foreign aid contingent on the
human rights performance of coun-
tries, an end to US repatriation of
Central American refugees, and US
support for "genuine" land reform.
Its Caribbean proposals center on
the reestablishment of US diplo-
matic and trade relations with Cuba
(An Alternative U.S. Policy toward
Cuba, Washington, DC, 1988).
The political practicality and
strategic wisdom of many of these
recommendations are questionable.
Some of PACCA's recommendations
imply an expanded US role in
reshaping Central American soci-
eties and politics. Experience with
the Alliance for Progress and other
assistance programs makes doubtful
the feasibility and desirability of
such US involvement.
A Time for Choices
A product of the Inter-American
Dialogue of the Aspen Institute, The
Americas in 1988: A Time for Choices
(Washington, DC, 1988) combines
moderation and urgency in address-
ing the hemisphere's problems of
Central America, debt, drugs,
migration, and democracy. The
report's moderation is no surprise
given that the Dialogue comprises a
panel of prominent US and Latin
American public figures. What is
surprising is the report's urgency, as
well as the extent of consensus
between the US and Latin American
participants. A Time for Choices
expresses a collective anxiety about
hemispheric affairs, as might be
found among the officers of a ship
lost in the fog.
The document supports winding
down the Central American conflict
and favors intervention along the
lines of the Contadora and
Esquipulas initiatives, which seek
peacemaking, democratization, and
economic development. The contras
should be resettled, refugees
assisted, and foreign aid provided to
rebuild economies. On economic
questions, debt relief is endorsed as
a first step by most of the partici-
pants and a last resort by the others.
Calls are made to increase capital
flows, to stimulate economic growth
to the level of 5% a year, and for
Latin American countries to adopt
"sound" economic policies.
Regarding drugs the document
emphasizes, first, the reduction of
US demand, and second, technical
assistance to Latin American gov-
ernments for drug control mea-
sures. It opposes sanctions against
Latin America and supports col-
laboration. It does not spell out
what collaboration means in prac-
tice, other than controlling demand
and cooperating in eradication
efforts.
Regarding migration the report
calls for improved mechanisms for
the cooperative and joint formula-
tion of policies. It also calls for US
cooperation in the restructuring of
Latin American civil-military rela-
tions. Such cooperation would
include US investment in efforts to
strengthen civilian institutions such
as parties, legislatures, and the
courts, as well as to instill demo-
cratic values among Latin American
military officers.
A Time for Choices is boldest and
most effective in its discussion of
policy approaches in Central Amer-
ica. Its attention to the military
question is a refreshing addition to
the policy agenda. The discussion of
economic issues is also effective,
although the proposals for debt
relief could be stronger. The sec-
tions on drugs, migration, and the
security threat to democracy offer
more diagnosis than prescription.
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Miami II
Miami Report II: New Perspectives on
Debt, Trade, and Investment-A Key to
US.-Latin American Relations in the
1990s (Coral Gables, Florida, 1988)
expresses the views of Miami civic
leaders and academics assembled by
the North-South Center of the
Graduate School of International
Studies at the University of Miami.
Sidestepping security issues,
Miami II focuses on the US's inabil-
ity to understand Latin America and
to provide hemispheric leadership.
The report points to Latin America's
economy as the toughest challenge,
followed by issues of immigration,
drug trafficking, and international
education.
Miami II does not clearly state
the causes of the US's failure to
provide leadership and consistent
policies. The document implies,
however, that these causes lie less in
the policy process than in the lack of
public awareness. It attributes this
lack of awareness to poor media cov-
erage and to "the insularity of our
educational system at the primary
and secondary levels" (p. 37).
The broadest recommendations
fall mainly outside the policy arena:
pressing politicians to define their
positions on Latin America, improv-
ing the public's understanding of
Latin America, and pushing the US
Treasury Department and the Fed-
eral Reserve to think about Latin
America. The document's basic eco-
nomic recommendation-that the
US government foster an improved
investment climate in Latin America
-is what might be expected from
a group involved in international
business.
Miami II argues for an immigra-
tion policy hospitable to political
refugees and for larger Caribbean
quotas. On drugs the report pro-
poses avoiding recrimination, study-
ing the impact in Latin America,
and curbing US drug use. On inter-
national education it asks the US to
promote international education
and language training in the public
schools and for Congress to provide
Caribbean scholarship funds.
Unfortunately Miami II avoids
controversial political issues, such as
Cuba, Central America, and military
assistance. The report's most origi-
nal feature is its emphasis on "inter-
national education," by which it does
not mean the manipulation of opin-
ion through "public democracy,"' but
rather a genuine elevation of US citi-
zens' understanding of Latin
America.
Mandate for Leadership III
Authored by the Heritage Founda-
tion, one of Washington's most con-
servative think tanks, Mandate for
Leadership III (1988) emphasizes a
straightforward national security
position: "United States global strat-
egy is based on a secure southern
flank. Central America, the Carib-
bean, and Mexico, in which 131 mil-
lion people live, is [sic] the most
crucial part of this flank" (p. 538).
Mandate III points to the strategic
importance of the region's sea traffic
lanes and its "vast economic poten-
tial" (p. 538).
The document praises the
Reagan administration for blunting
Soviet expansion, spurring the
spread of democratic institutions,
and in the case of Nicaragua, "pre-
venting the consolidation of another
communist regime in the hemi-
sphere" (p. 539). It follows this cur-
sory praise, however, with pointed
criticisms of Reagan's policies in the
Caribbean Basin. The analysis faults
the Reagan-Wright peace plan for
undercutting contra successes and
encouraging Central American
presidents to pursue their own
peace initiatives.
Mandate III blames Latin Amer-
ica's economic stagnation on "social-
ist and statist economic policies"
(p. 542) and seeks to link economic
aid to policies that protect private
property and reduce the state sec-
tor. It also seeks a reduction in the
debt burden and in trade and tariff
barriers to Mexican and Caribbean
products.
Mandate II's policy recommen-
dations on Cuba are the most hard-
line of all the documents in this
review. They call for the new presi-
dent to unilaterally abrogate the
1962 Kennedy-Khrushchev US
agreement, which guarantees that
the US will not invade Cuba. The US
should repeatedly denounce Cuba
in international forums, pressure
Western banks to cease loans to
Cuba, stigmatize US companies that
trade with Cuba, establish TV
Marti, and support the growth of
Cuban domestic opposition.
The recommendations con-
cerning Nicaragua are similar in
tone: Mandate III calls for giving
Nicaragua three months to take
concrete steps to "dismantle the
Marxist-Leninist structure" (p. 550).
Failing this, the US should break
relations, obtain military assistance
for the contras, and finance the
Nicaraguan internal opposition.
A contradiction between Man-
date IIs indictment of Reagan's pol-
icy failures and the actions it
recommends is that the latter repre-
sent a check list of the policies
implemented by the Reagan admin-
istration in one form or another.
Insofar as the administration's Latin
American failures resulted from
such policies, Mandate IIls recom-
mendations can only have similar
results.
Third Century
The Third Century: US. Latin Ameri-
can Policy Choices for the 1990s (1988)
reflects the deliberations of experts
convened by the Center for Strategic
and International Studies (CSIS), a
moderately conservative Washington
think tank. Third Century's premise
is that the hemispheric problems of
US policy are rooted in the policy
process itself rather than in global
or regional developments. Thus,
"a policy stalemate in Washington"
(p. 2) has prevented effective
responses to challenges such as eco-
nomic problems and the debt bur-
den, immigration and refugee flows,
and narcotics trafficking, as well as
Soviet influence, regionalism, and
political instability.
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The report pins part of the
blame for policy stalemate on Latin
American specialists and their "irre-
sponsible attitude" (p. 2), claiming
"moderate Latin Americanists are
few in number" (p. 3) and "hostile to
Latin American policy in practically
any form" (p. 3). Third Century rec-
ommends the creation of a "new
generation of analysts and institu-
tions" (p. 4) to sustain the US's Latin
American policy process. Yet few
Latin Americanists played even
minor roles in the formulation of US
foreign policy under Reagan. They
can hardly be blamed for the prob-
lems of a process in which they were
not involved.
Third Century tends to avoid pol-
icy recommendations. Yet it does
call for easing the debt burden,
strengthening the international mili-
tary education program and the
National Endowment for Democ-
racy, testing the antidrug capa-
bilities of the Organization of
American States (OAS), and facili-
tating the flow of foreign invest-
ment. The most decisive statements
concern Cuba: "The next president
should resist the temptation to
break with long-standing policy
towards Cuba by rescinding trade
sanctions.... The goal of regional
peace and prosperity is better
achieved by a policy that highlights
the antidemocratic character of con-
temporary Cuba" (p. 38).
Most likely to stir up controversy
is the document's premise that the
problem with US policy toward
Latin America lies in the policy pro-
cess itself. Many specialists would
argue that Latin American problems
like debt, drugs, and insurrection
stem from causes unrelated to the
conduct of US foreign policy.
Santa Fe II
Santa Fe II: A Strategy for Latin
America in the Nineties (The Commit-
tee of Santa Fe, 1988) places Latin
American problems in the context
of a "communist conflict strategy"
that seeks to involve "Western secu-
rity forces in protracted operations
simultaneously in several countries"
(p. 3), with the strategic goal of
"reducing US forwarded commit-
ments on the Euro-Asian land mass
and thereby enhancing Soviet coer-
cive ability" (p. 3).
Nevertheless, Santa Fe II centers
on Latin American problems that
are of hemispheric rather than
Soviet origin. It treats the Soviet
threat as an endemic disease: as the
health of the patient deteriorates,
the disease-communist subver-
sion-will do more damage. The
document's recommendations are
designed to nurse the patient back
to health.
Santa Fe II identifies several
policy problems, including debt-
aggravated economic stagnation,
narcotics trafficking, immigration,
statism, and debilitated hemispheric
institutions. Underlying its analysis
of Latin American politics is a
distinction between regime and
society. Democracy occurs when a
society holds its regime accountable.
When a society loses this control and
falls under the regime's sway, the
result is "statism." Santa Fe II views
Latin American statism as a cultural
inheritance with affinities to Soviet
statism. Accordingly US strategy
should counter the statist threat
culturally, such as through educa-
tional initiatives that target
bureaucrats and the military, and by
strengthening private and public
institutional bulwarks against
statism. Success in promoting
democracy (i.e. reducing statism)
will also reduce the Soviet threat.
This argument produces
innovative policy recommendations.
The section on economic strategy
calls unequivocally for reducing the
debt burden of Latin America as
the first step in reviving economic
growth. It also calls for US help in
establishing national capital markets
in Latin America, privatizing state
enterprises, revitalizing the
Caribbean Basin Initiative, and
expanding reciprocal agricultural
trade with Latin America.
Other proposals, however, reflect
a traditional concern with national
security. The report proposes to
expand military assistance to Latin
America to cope with low-intensity
conflict, to support Nicaraguan
democratization, to educate the US
media and public to the hemispheric
threat of communist subversion,
and to develop bipartisan coopera-
tion between Congress and the
White House.
As for specific countries, the
recommendations regarding Cuba
are the most striking: negotiate
directly with the Soviet Union on its
military withdrawal from Cuba
and open talks with Castro or his
successor. In short, "the US should
signal its desire to rapidly normalize
Hemisphere * Summer 1989
LACC Studies on
Latin America and the Caribbean
in conjunction with Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.
LACC Studies on Latin America and the Caribbean
presents new perspectives on the contemporary and
historical forces--political, economic, social, and
cultural-that shape emerging realities in the region.
Forthcoming Volumes
Heraldo Mufioz and Carlos Portales, Elusive Friendship: A
Survey of U.S.-Chilean Relations
Andrds Opazo Bernales, Social Crisis and Popular-Religious
Movements in Central America
For information, contact Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.,
1800 30th Street, Boulder, CO 80301, (303) 444-6684.
relations with a de-Sovietized
Cuba-a normalization that would
include the dropping of the trade
embargo" (p. 33). The only recom-
mendation at odds with this dra-
matic agenda is that of establishing
TV Marti.
Santa Fe I's prescriptions raise
operational questions. For example,
how would the US inculcate
democracy among Latin American
bureaucrats? Would the US support
the banning of noncommunist
"statist" parties on the grounds that
they are antidemocratic? Moreover
Santa Fe II glosses over complex
issues with allusions subject to
double meanings (e.g., "democracy"
in Nicaragua, which could mean the
installation of a counterrevolution-
ary regime or reforms under the
revolutionary regime).
Despite such caveats, Santa Fe II
is remarkably progressive. The
authors sum up their report as a
proactive, rather than reactive,
strategy for attacking Latin America's
problems. Proposals to negotiate
with Castro, reopen trade relations
with Cuba, relieve debt burdens, save
tropical rain forests, phase out sugar
protection, and revitalize the OAS,
are forward-looking. Santa Fe II shows
that traditional emphasis on national
security and opposition to big gov-
ernment can give rise to an innova-
tive agenda.
A Bipartisan Mood
What is striking about these reports
is that, in spite of the fundamental
differences in their political
premises, they present remarkably
similar agendas for US policy
toward Latin America. They agree
on the inclusion of the issues of
debt, democracy, Central America,
narcotics, and immigration. And
they agree on the need for a
bipartisan Latin American policy.
The reports devote little or no
attention, however, to the issues of
communist subversion, the Soviet
military threat, border conflicts,
population, urbanization, human
rights, dictatorship, direct foreign
investment, and nonhemispheric
(i.e. Asian) trade and investment.
Santa Fe II stands more or less
alone in emphasizing communist
subversion, Latin American statism,
and ecology.
If Santa Fe HII and PACCA's
Alternative epitomize the conserva-
tive and liberal perspectives, then
convergence towards bipartisanship
is under way. Even on US-Cuban rela-
tions Santa Fe H and PACCA's Alter-
native call for negotiations to lift
the trade embargo and reestablish
full relations with Cuba. Whether
the objective is to detach Cuba from
the Soviet orbit or to terminate the
counterrevolutionary bias of US
policy, the proposals are compatible.
A mood of consensus on US-
Latin American relations has
arrived. Has the failure of recent
policy experiments meant the
exhaustion of radical and reac-
tionary options? Has the link
between partisanship and policy
incoherence stimulated a
reconsideration of US policy? Are
hemispheric events changing the
historic parameters that have
shaped policy, leading to greater
agreement on the definition of
issues? In any case, this is clearly
a time of creative opportunities
in US-Latin American relations. .
The Narrative of
Liberation
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WHemispheric Controversy
Partners in Conflict: The United
States and Latin America
by Abraham Lowenthal. The Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1987
240 pp. Cloth. $24.50.
Hard Choices
by Mark Falcoff
A book on US-Latin American rela-
tions by Abraham Lowenthal is
bound to be worthy of serious read-
ing and discussion throughout the
hemisphere. This is so not only
because of the author's scholarly
expertise, which is among the high-
est in our profession, but also
because of his active engagement in
hemispheric affairs over many years.
Such engagement is exemplified by
his role in establishing the Latin
American program at the Woodrow
Wilson Center of the Smithsonian
Institution, and more recently his
role in the Inter-American Dialogue,
a panel of US, Caribbean, and Latin
American personalities who peri-
odically frame policy alternatives.
Partners in Conflict reflects this par-
ticipation. The book is therefore a
valuable synthesis of a particular
approach to US-Latin American
relations, which is shared, at least
rhetorically, by important segments
of the US political and intellectual
community.
Precisely because Lowenthal and
I hold very different points of view,
let me begin by singling out some of
what I particularly like about Part-
ners in Conflict. First, though the
book is a mere 240 pages, it is
remarkably comprehensive. Anyone
who attempts to synthesize a large
and complicated subject such as US-
Latin American relations deserves
much praise and sympathy. Second,
the book is moderate in tone, spirit,
and purpose. Lowenthal deliberately
distances himself from dependency
theory and the notion-still preva-
lent in leftist academic circles at
home and abroad-that what is
good for Latin America must always
be bad for the US and vice versa. In
fact Lowenthal assumes the oppo-
site: that there are, or at least should
be, common interests between the
US and Latin America. (Reading
this book helped me to understand
why, not at all to his discredit, Low-
enthal was recently defeated for the
presidency of the Latin American
Studies Association.)
Third, the book is admirably
detailed. While Lowenthal has a
broad philosophical approach, he
descends to the particular in chap-
ters on Mexico, Brazil, and the
Caribbean. He successfully moves
from the general to the specific with
fluency, authority, and in many cases
a careful sorting-out of issues.
Finally, Lowenthal does not simply
criticize but offers alternatives.
While I often find myself at variance
with his interpretations, or even his
notion of the facts of the case, I am
favorably impressed by the audacity
and seriousness of the overall effort.
As the World Turns
More than a decade ago, Lowenthal
wrote an important article in Foreign
Affairs (October 1976) outlining a
new approach to US-Latin Ameri-
can relations. The article urged us
to abandon what Lowenthal called
the "hemispheric presumption." In
some ways this approach became the
informing spirit of the Carter
administration's policy, although in
other ways it merely stated certain
changes in the world that nobody
had bothered to catalogue. Low-
enthal said then what he repeats and
develops in Partners in Conflict: there
has been a qualitative and quantita-
tive change in the position of Latin
American nations towards the US.
The US is no longer the sole or, in
some cases, even the principal
source of capital, technology, and
investments. Nor is it necessarily the
single most important market.
In Lowenthal's view the US, par-
ticularly the Reagan administration,
has failed to grasp this change, and
instead seeks to restore US hegem-
ony, especially in the Caribbean
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Basin. The US clings to an outdated
view of security interests and, to
some degree, economic interests,
focusing our concern on the stabil-
ity of the new Latin American
democracies. This tendency pre-
vents us from pursuing what for
Lowenthal should be our real inter-
est in the region: the promotion of
prosperous, developing, nonaligned
neighbors.
In theory, of course, the US
should favor all good things and
oppose all bad things. In the real
world, however, we must make
choices based on resources and on
the outcomes we are willing to pay
for. We may no longer be hege-
monic, but we are still important. In
fact, precisely because we no longer
are hegemonic, we must allocate our
policy energies and our resources
more selectively than in the past.
Why then should we abandon the
pursuit of national self-interest in
our relations with 20 or so other
nations, all of whom are not sur-
prisingly pursuing their self-interest
in their relations with us?
This point lies at the heart of my
differences with Partners in Conflict.
For Lowenthal the US is pursuing its
national self-interest only when it is
doing what the Latin American
nations, or rather, their leaders,
want us to do. This stance leads him
to deplore any and all differences
between Washington and the Latin
American capitals; when we are
doing what the Latins want, that is
"cooperation" (i.e. good); when we
are not, that is "confrontation" or
"conflict" (i.e. bad). I found him fall-
ing into this trap even in his discus-
sion of US relations with Brazil dur-
ing the Carter years: "First the US
government attempted, without
consulting the Brazilian govern-
ment, to persuade West Germany to
break its contract to provide sensi-
tive nuclear technology to Brazil.
Then Washington aggravated rela-
tions by heralding its human rights
policy in ways Brazil's government
found offensive. These two specific
irritants were considerably allevi-
ated in the course of the Carter
period, but the underlying economic
conflicts continued, and the nuclear
issue also remained divisive. The
United States and Brazil were still at
odds at the end of the 1970s" (p. 129).
As I read this I found myself say-
ing, of course this is so, and what of
it? I am not in the habit of recalling
the Carter administration with nos-
talgia, but if, by its lights, nuclear
nonproliferation and human rights
were high enough on its agenda, it
had every right to advance them in
its bilateral relationship with Brazil.
To be sure, this might actually harm
the long-term interests of the US,
but that would be an error of judg-
ment, not an act of misconduct. The
fact of conflict is hardly worth deplor-
ing in and of itself; what else are
international relations made of? Dif-
ferences between sovereign nations
can be avoided altogether only if one
side accepts the agenda of the other
-surely not a realistic proposal.
Lowenthal also seems remarka-
bly insensitive to the way in which a
decline in US hegemony has deprived
the Latin American nations of their
M
former leverage with Washington.
In the past the close (and in some cases
even suffocating) relationship pro-
vided a climate in which successive US
administrations felt a certain sense of
responsibility for outcomes in the
Southern Hemisphere. The traditional
security rationale, which Lowenthal
discards as outdated and irrelevant,
guided both the Good Neighbor
Policy and the Alliance for Progress.
To the extent Americans, partic-
ularly members of the US Congress,
become convinced there is no
serious security interest south of
Mexico-or even north of it, for that
matter-Latin America will simply
drop off the face of the Earth.
According to the world map implicit
in the latest version of the US For-
eign Assistance Act, El Salvador is
larger than Mexico and South Korea
is larger than Brazil. This is ridicu-
lous, but then so is much of the way
the world works.
Lowenthal actually believes the
US does not fully appreciate the way
in which Latin America's prosperity
is tied to its own. He recites the
usual statistics about US jobs lost
because of the inability of Latin
American nations to purchase our
products, and more than once raises
the guarded threat of unlimited
immigration if Latin America's basic
economic problems are not
resolved. It would be easy to take
issue with both extrapolations. The
crucial points, however, seem to be
that most Latin American govern-
ments are organized to distribute
resources rather than create wealth;
most are undermining business con-
fidence and driving native capital
abroad; most have public sectors
that consume ever larger shares of
the budget; and most are essentially
bankrupt welfare states seeking an
international bailout. These are
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realities that any US policy must
face and perhaps accept before
advancing to more ambitious
agenda.
Lowenthal recognizes many of
these things, but his analysis does
not give them their proper weight.
They are not merely aspects of a
complex situation but the central fac-
tors that broadly condition the inter-
national business environment and
investors' perception of Latin Amer-
ica. Lowenthal sees vast possibilities
in future US-Latin American eco-
nomic relations. That is his privilege.
Most bankers, entrepreneurs, and
not a few members of Congress,
however, look upon Latin America
as a kind of economic black hole.
The news that reaches us daily from,
say, Peru and Argentina, does little
to counteract this image. Lowenthal
fears the growth of radical populism
and nationalism, and he sees a need
for the US to preempt both threats
with a bold and imaginative new pol-
icy. But how seriously should we take
such an eventuality? Once the hege-
monic presumption has been aban-
doned, even the worst-case scenario
loses its sting.
Choosing Carefully
In selecting US relations with Mex-
ico and Brazil, Lowenthal rightly
points out that the operative princi-
ples are pragmatism and a prefer-
ence for settling issues on a case-by-
case basis. Admittedly the results
are not always exciting and, of
course, anything can be improved
upon. But to suggest, as he does,
that somehow the best way to deal
with such countries is to subsume
our bilateral relations within a
larger Third World framework is
intolerably ambitious. Isn't the pol-
icy process in the US fragmented
and disorganized enough without
folding more countries and issues
into a larger envelope?
Moreover, Lowenthal often over-
simplifies policy choices, as if they
were entirely discrete. Examples
include economic equity versus pri-
vate investment, military aid versus
civilian control, "ideological plural-
ism" versus human rights, human
rights versus nonintervention, and
promotion of democracy versus
respect for individual sovereignties.
As Anthony Lake, a former Carter
administration official, has pointed
out, in the real world principles are
often as much in conflict with each
other as with pragmatism or real-
politik. In this sense Lowenthal's
evaluation of Carter policy is
ungenerous and unfair. I do, how-
ever, applaud his willingness to
admit there are certain well-
established parameters within
which Latin American policy
operates in the US regardless of
administrations. This is a refresh-
ing change from the notion, so
often retailed nowadays by certain
liberal Democratic academics,
that all good things happen
under one party and all bad
things under another.
Given the unsatisfactory nature
of public life in most Latin Ameri-
can countries, there will always be
plenty to complain about. And given
the continuing, though declining,
role of the US as a major external
power, there will always be a tempta-
tion to assign more blame and more
responsibility to Washington than is
appropriate. But as we enter into the
fullness of the post-hegemonic age,
the importance of Latin America to
the US seems to be in danger of
becoming purely negative.
Much of Congress's enthusiasm
for "nonintervention" (or for "diplo-
macy'," as it is sometimes called) in
Nicaragua is a result of the impulse
towards neglect of, and disinterest
in, the region as a whole. Mexico,
because it shares a long frontier
with the US, will always get special
consideration. The rest of the
region, however, may find itself
in a curious limbo. It has wandered
too far from the US to exert much
claim upon the latter's time, energy,
and resources, but remains farther
still from anywhere else. This
is not a happy outcome for most
countries, but something more than
the admirable, controlled idealism
of Partners in Conflict will be needed
to avoid it. .
Common Ground
by Rosario Green
Abraham Lowenthal's Partners in
Conflict emphasizes a point that
commonly escapes US academics
and diplomats: Latin America is no
longer a backward, agro-exporting,
isolated area ruled by premodern
caudillos in need of guidance by the
Great Northern Power. As Low-
enthal observes, contemporary
Latin America, despite its myriad
problems, is well on the road to
democracy, modernity, and maturity.
With this point of departure, Part-
ners in Conflict focuses on how Wash-
ington has responded and how it
should respond to its loss of hegem-
ony in Latin America. The answers
it provides make Partners in Conflict
an indispensable book for scholars
and policymakers alike.
Lowenthal argues that Latin
American challenges to US hegem-
ony-such as the Cuban and
Nicaraguan Revolutions, Vene-
zuelan leadership in formulating
OPEC strategy, and the creation of
the Contadora Group-reflect not
only the region's maturation. They
also reflect its diminishing relative
importance as a site of US invest-
ment and as a trading partner.
How then has Washington
responded? Most basically, accord-
ing to Lowenthal, by alternating
between policies of "positive" inter-
vention, "negative" intervention,
and indifference. Kennedy's Alliance
for Progress and Carter's human
rights diplomacy fall under the first
category. Reagan's obsession with
the Caribbean Basin falls under the
second, and the Johnson and Nixon-
Ford approaches fall under the
third. Lowenthal contends that
none of the three orientations
acknowledged the loss of US hegem-
ony, and that the traditional concep-
tion of US hemispheric interests is in
need of profound revision.
Rosario Green is a political scientist
at the Instituto Matias Romero, in
Mexico City.
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Lowenthal builds his case by mar-
shalling evidence against US
analysts and policymakers who con-
sider Latin America a region of
diminishing strategic relevance. To
begin with, Latin America is exert-
ing growing influence on the US
economy, especially in terms of US
exports and banking. Further, mas-
sive migration, particularly from
Mexico, the Caribbean, and Central
America, is significantly changing
daily life in the US. Drug trafficking,
terrorism, environmental degrada-
tion, and nuclear proliferation in
Latin America pose escalating
threats, while the region's economic
and political conditions jeopardize
the preservation of basic US values,
such as human rights (p. 55).
With this evidence in mind, the
author turns to what he regards as
the priorities of US policy toward
Latin America: trade, finance, and
migration. Lowenthal's hypothesis is
that regional economic problems,
rather than the internal conflicts of
Central America, are the fundamen-
tal threats to the hemisphere's
security and stability. US policy,
Lowenthal writes, should "respond
to Latin America's needs" by focus-
ing "much more on trade, finance
and migration-and less on MIGs
and guerrillas" (p. 65).
Lowenthal discusses these priori-
ties in light of the varying circum-
stances of the area's subregions and
nations. This discussion interweaves
rich description with Lowenthal's
own proposals for improving inter-
American relations. What stands out
in these proposals is their modera-
tion and pragmatism, as well as the
ethical principles on which they
stand.
Regarding Mexico, for example,
this tone surfaces in the form of
sensitivity to the country's legacy of
antagonistic relations with the US.
Lowenthal writes that US policy
must avoid not only unilateral mea-
sures but also an asphyxiating "spe-
cial relationship"' both of which
could inflame Mexican nationalist
sentiment. As for Brazil, he stresses
that it is no longer simply the eco-
nomic power of South America, but
rather one of the ten largest econ-
omies in the world. US policymakers
must therefore recognize that Bra-
zil's economic and geopolitical inter-
ests are becoming more diversified
and independent, and that it pos-
sesses increasing leverage in its rela-
tions with the US.
The Caribbean Basin, in Low-
enthal's view, consists of two zones,
the Caribbean islands and Central
America. Nevertheless, the US, he
says, has rooted its policy in the
notion that both zones constitute its
"third front." Consequently Wash-
ington strategists have insisted on
maintaining a high profile in the
Caribbean Basin predicated on
a diffuse concept of "national
security," which in fact manifests a
fundamental sense of "national
insecurity" (p. 155).
From Lowenthal's standpoint,
the Caribbean Basin poses only min-
imal threats to US security. Hence
the appropriate US policy should be
neither one of sustained or inter-
mittent intervention, nor one of
complete withdrawal. Instead he
recommends a policy of "commit-
ment to the economic and social
development of the nations of the
Caribbean Basin without a corre-
sponding attempt to exercise tight
control of their internal affairs"
(p. 165). He goes on to say that this
approach would permit the US to
address its strategic interests in the
Caribbean Basin without losing
sight of its more serious concerns in
Mexico and South America.
Partners in Conflict deserves
praise for its moderate, pragmatic
perspective on US policy toward
Latin America. But one of the book's
proposals-its call for a strength-
ened version of the Baker debt-relief
plan-and one aspect of the book's
analysis-its contradictory discus-
sion of the Nicaraguan Revolu-
tion-should not go unchallenged.
The Baker plan was a novel initia-
tive for resolving Latin America's
debt crisis. Since it failed, however,
to address the root causes of the
crisis, a bolstered version of the plan
would be no panacea for the region's
debt problems. No matter how com-
prehensive and well-intentioned, a
program of financial assistance
would not be enough. What the
crisis demands are a debt-relief pro-
gram (even more aggressive than the
"second" Brady plan) and a large-
scale reform of the international
financial system that incorporates
the premises of the "New Interna-
tional Economic Order," that is, an
overhaul of the terms of North-
South economic relations.
As for the Nicaraguan Revolu-
tion, Lowenthal insists on demon-
strating that it poses no threat to US
security. Nevertheless, he charac-
terizes the Sandinista regime as
"authoritarian and repressive of
political freedom" (p. 193). To this
characterization Lowenthal adds
unsubstantiated claims, such as the
following: "Nicaragua under the
Sandinistas could harm the security
of the Hemisphere. It has supported
revolutionary movements else-
where.... The question is not
whether Nicaragua represents a
challenge but how best to respond
to it" (p. 193). This analysis, includ-
ing its policy implications, is clearly
in need of rethinking.
The fact remains that the
strengths of this book much out-
weigh its weaknesses. The US and
Latin America face monumental,
interlocking challenges that demand
a combination of pragmatism and
imagination. As Lowenthal asserts, a
deepening of Latin America's eco-
nomic and social crisis, as well as
heightened US protectionism and
interventionism, would touch off
increased unrest, authoritarianism,
and nationalism in Latin America. A
result would be an "era of deep hos-
tility in United States-Latin Ameri-
can relations" (p. 181). It is time for
us to realize that the crisis in our
relations implies risks and oppor-
tunities, and to act accordingly. At
issue is nothing less than hemi-
spheric peace, justice, and prosper-
ity. Lowenthal's Partners in Conflict
points us in the right direction. .
(Translated by Ruth Gubler)
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Perestroika and Latin America
by Marian Goslinga
ver since Mikhail Gorbachev introduced the concept in 1985, perestroika has become the glamour word for
Soviet economic policy-domestic as well as foreign. The Soviet leader's steadfast pursuit of economic reform
not only has changed the course of East-West relations but has added a new dimension to Soviet-Latin Ameri-
can relations-especially where Cuba is concerned. Although Fidel Castro has chosen to deal with Cuba's eco-
nomic problems by way of "rectificacibn," the course of Soviet-Cuban relations has unequivocally been altered.
This section lists publications in periodicals from 1988 to May 1989 on the impact of perestroika in Latin
America. Since previous articles and information can be located in standard reference sources, this list refers
only to the most recent literature and is not intended as a definitive bibliography.
The Beard Singed. The Economist,
v. 309, no. 7581 (December 17, 1988),
p. 43. [Editorial on Fidel Castro's
attitude towards the new Soviet
reforms.]
Castro's Cuba in Gorbachev's Era.
Carlos Alberto Montaner. Society,
v. 25, no. 4 (May-June 1988), p. 27
Castro's Gorbachev Problem:
Cuban Foreign Policy in the
Hemisphere. Carla Anne Robbins.
US. News and World Report, v. 106,
no. 1 (January 9, 1989), p. 40.
Castro: Dilemmas of the Last Ideal-
ist. Tad Szulc. New Perspectives Quar-
terly, v. 5, no. 4 (Winter 1988), p. 50.
[Deals with Castro's reactions to the
new Soviet reforms.]
Cuba, the Revolution: Toward
Victory Always, but When? George
Black. The Nation, v. 247, no. 11,
(October 24, 1988), p. 373.
Cuba-URSS en beneficio mfituo.
Rail Lazo. Bohemia, no. 11 (March
11, 1988), pp. 48-51. [Discusses the
economic interdependence between
the two countries and the effect of
perestroika on this relationship.]
Marian Goslinga is the Latin Ameri-
can and Caribbean librarian at Florida
International University.
Cuba: Quarterly Situation Report.
Prepared by the Office of Research
and Policy for the staff of the Radio
Marti Program. Washington, D.C..
United States Information Agency,
Radio Marti Program. [A current
summary of events in Cuba (social,
economic, and political) published
four times a year since 1988.]
Cuban Economic Slowdown
Threatens Living Standards. Carib-
bean Insight, v. 12, no. 4 (April 1989),
pp. 3-4. [Editorial.]
The Cuban Economy: Too Poor for
Perestroika. Caribbean Insight, v. 12,
no. 4 (April 1989), pp. 3-4.
[Editorial.]
Gorbachev Yields No Ground Yet.
John Felton. Congressional Quarterly
Weekly Report, v. 47, no. 14 (April 8,
1989), p. 768. [About the domestic
and foreign opposition to
perestroika.]
Gorbachev's Greatest Challenge:
Perestroika and the National
Question. Graham Smith. Political
Geography Quarterly, v. 8, no. 1
(January 1989), pp. 7-21.
Hacia la eficacia econ6mica:
entrevista con Laureano Le6n,
presidente de la Asociaci6n Nacio-
nal de Economistas de Cuba.
America Latina (USSR), no. 1 (1989),
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